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As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from 2002 until February 2014, the 
European Union (EU) undertook over thirty overseas operations, using civilian and military 
instruments, in several countries, spread across three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia). 
Sixteen of these operations are ongoing, with eighteen completed. Peacekeeping missions 
play a central role to the European Union’s (EU) Development Policy and the 2016 Global 
Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy. Using content analysis on the 2016 Global Strategy 
and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports, this research aims to use the case studies of the EU 
Capacity Building Mission Sahel Mali and EU Training M Mali missions to analyse whether the 
2016 Global Strategy has had an influence on the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali. These 
missions, initiated by the EU and its Member States, are viewed as essential in addressing key 
issues in the Sahel region including: extreme poverty, frequent food and nutrition crises, 
conflict, high population growth rates, institutional weaknesses, irregular migration and 
related crimes such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling. This thesis uses Chris Hills 
Capabilities-Expectations Gap to determine whether the gap between what the EU is 
expected to do by the international community and what the EU is actually able to deliver still 
exists despite developments in EU foreign policy. This thesis analyses sections of the 2016 EU 
Global Strategy determined by the frequency of terms and concepts within the Strategy and 
provides evidence from the Annual CSDP Reports from 2016-2017 to suggest that there is a 
strong correlation between the release of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 and the two ongoing 












I would first like to thank my primary supervisor Dr. Serena Kelly for her constant guidance 
and encouragement throughout writing this thesis, also to my secondary supervisor Professor 
Martin Holland for his sound advice. I extend my gratitude to the National Centre for Research 
on Europe at the University of Canterbury. The Taught Master of European Union Studies 
incorporated many of the most engaging and challenging courses that I have had the 
opportunity to enrol in at the University of Canterbury over the past 4 years. I also thank the 
NCRE for giving me the opportunity to intern at the Asia-Europe Foundation in Singapore as 
part of my Taught Masters, this was an experience I am most grateful for. 
I would also like to thank the New Zealand Treasury for employing me halfway through my 
Masters programme and giving me the opportunity to begin my career as a policy analyst in 
the 2019 Graduate Programme.  
My penultimate thanks goes to my parents, for everything they have done for me and all they 
will continue to do. 
Finally, I thank my partner for his ongoing support and encouraging me to follow my career 














CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and 
territory…Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at 
home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions 
(Union, 2016 14).  
The 2003 European Security Strategy marked the inception of the European Union Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has conducted over 
thirty international missions using civilian and military instruments with sixteen missions 
currently ongoing. These CSDP missions implement a range of tools including conflict 
prevention, peacebuilding, providing aid and recognising the link between security and 
development. The European Union External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for CSDP and 
some of the other tools at their disposal which include development cooperation, refugee 
protection and migration, EU enlargement and neighbourhood and their humanitarian and 
emergency response. CSDP has been regarded as the EU’s most successful tool in addressing 
complex challenges through using a multidimensional approach (Kmec, 2015 9).  
Since the creation of CSDP missions, the EU has become an important global actor in crisis 
management, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. These missions have been highlighted 
by Federica Mogherini -- High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy -- as being at the heart of EU foreign policy (EEAS, 2017c 4). In a changing global 
political, economic and social environment instability outside European borders has, and will 
continue to have, direct relevance to the daily lives of European citizens: the spread of a 
terrorist group, or the existence of ungoverned spaces in the EU’s region represents a clear 
risk for all European citizens (EEAS, 2016a 2). The EU has set a priority for itself as being a 
stronger global actor (Commission, 2016) addressing complex external issues beyond its 
borders to promote peace, security and sustainable development. This global actorness is a 
source of pride for the EU, but it has also created expectations of the EU that has resulted in 
the need for new policy and initiatives to meet the growing demands of being an international 
actor. 
Part of this role is connected to development. The EU prides itself on being the largest 
financial contributor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world, in addition, the 
EU has become one of the most influential superpowers (Rövid, 2012) on the international 
stage with a declared commitment towards global peace and security as laid out in the 2016 
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EU Global Strategy (EUGS). This thesis aims to focus on two of the EU’s ongoing missions in 
Mali to determine whether the 2016 EU Global Strategy has influenced the mandates of these 
two operations in order to determine their contribution to upholding international peace and 
security. These two CSDP missions are key examples of the range of multidimensional tools 
used by the EU as they incorporate initiatives such as judicial training and policing, border 
management, peacekeeping, disarmament, arms control and the nexus between security and 
development (Biscop and Anderson, 2007 98). The EU is a unique global actor, it has expanded 
its domain of activities since the Cold War and now has well-established economic power and 
capabilities as a security and development provider (Laursen, 2009 24). With the launch of 
CSDP missions in 2003 the EU has emerged as an important actor in peacebuilding and 
contributing to upholding international peace and security, complementing the work of the 
United Nations (UN) in these areas. 
 Mali is located in the Sahel region of Africa and faces multiple challenges and threats which 
has resulted in the EU deploying three missions to the region; EU Capacity Building Mission 
Sahel Mali (EUCAP), EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM) and EUTM Niger. The complex security 
issues that the EU has aimed to address through these missions were consequences of the 
conflict erupting in 2011 with the toppling of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. This 
toppling ultimately caused deteriorations in Libya’s neighbouring countries political, 
economic and security situations, especially in Mali (Lavallee and Volkel, 2015 159). Ethnic 
clashes and criminal activity in Mali’s territory led to a military coup in March 2012 and a 
significant outbreak of violence. The violence in Mali throughout 2012 consequently displaced 
more than 500,000 people and killed several hundred (Lavallee and Volkel, 2015 161). The 
conflict in the Sahel region during this time was very complex due to the number of actors 
and other factors, but the key cause of the coup was the Tuareg rebels who took advantage 
of the weak security structures in Mali and declared an independent state of Azawad in April 
2012 (Snijders, 2015 13).  
Following the conflicts in the region during 2012, the European Parliament named the Sahel 
region “one of the poorest regions in the world” (Tannock, 2013). Mali was also referred to 
as the world’s most “worsened country” by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 
in their Failed States Index for 2013 (Snijders, 2015 161). The question in 2012 was how the 
EU could best contribute to conflict resolution and consolidate the peace process in the Sahel 
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region. Historical relations with Europe and France in particular had a major role in the 
establishment of CSDP missions in Mali, the role of France will be further expanded upon in 
the discussion, chapter 5. 
To address regional challenges such as corruption, terrorism, underdevelopment, weak 
institutional structures and the illegal arms trade, the EU released their Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel in March 20118. The implementation of this strategy started in 
three countries: Mali, Mauritania and Niger because the problems were cross border and 
interrelated. One of the major themes of the Sahel Strategy is the nexus between security 
and development, the EEAS used the case of Mali to elaborate on the relationship by 
commenting that; 
The fragility of governments impacts on the stability of the region and the ability to 
combat both poverty and security threats, which are on the rise. Poverty creates 
inherent instability that can impact on uncontrolled migratory flows. The security 
threat from terrorist activity by al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), which has found 
sanctuary in Northern Mali, is focused on Western targets and has evolved from taking 
money to taking life, discouraging investment in the region (EEAS, 2011).  
The reason the EU acts in fragile countries, as was the case in Mali, is because one of the main 
objectives of the EU development policy is to reach Global Goals as set out by the UN. The 
most current Global Goals were set out by all Member States of the UN in 2015 which 
incorporated 17 goals for all countries to meet by 2030 for a better world. The first set of 
these goals, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), were laid out in 2000 and were built 
on in 2015 with the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) which are the 
most recent. Fragile countries are the furthest away from reaching these Global Goals and 
often contribute to international insecurity. Fragile countries are listed as one of the main 
threats to Europe’s security (Laurens, 2014 3). The EU has become an important actor in 
fragile countries focusing on peacebuilding and state building by supporting domestic and 
international actors through long-term engagement (Faria and Sherriff, 2009 4). The start of 
this long-term engagement in Mali was in February 2013 with the launch of the first CSDP 
mission, EUTM Mali. EUTM Mali was established to help restore lasting peace in Mali with the 
long-term aim of ensuring sustainable stability in the Sahel region. At the request of the 
                                                          




Malian Government and on the basis of UN resolutions, in particular the UN Security Council 
Resolution 2085, the Member States of the European Union agreed to establish a mission to 
train the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF), EUTM Mali (EEAS, 2018f). EUTM Mali is an ongoing 
mission with a mandate lasting until May 2020. 













As can be seen in Figure One, EUTM Mali has the support of all EU Member States with 580 
personnel currently being contributed to achieve the mandate. This shows the substantial 
amount of political will towards Mali’s long-term peace and stability given the fact that all 
CSDP missions are voluntary and require collective resources from Member States of the EU. 
The EU continued its commitment to a long-lasting solution in Mali with the introduction of a 
second mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali. This mission, under the CSDP framework, was launched in 
January 2015 to “provide assistance and advice to the national police, the national 
gendarmerie and the national guard in the implementation of the security reform set out by 
the new government, with a view to: 
                                                          
9 EEAS. 2013. EUTM Mali [Online]. Available: http://eutmmali.eu/ [Accessed 24 February 2018]. 
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• Improve their operational efficiency 
• Re-establish their respective hierarchical chains 
• Reinforce the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the 
management and supervision of their missions 
• Facilitate their redeployment to the north of the country” (EEAS, 2018e) 












The mandate has recently been renewed until January 2019 and includes “the Accord for 
Peace & Reconciliation” and a stronger emphasis on coordination of security forces from the 
G5 Sahel countries (EEAS, 2018e). Although, as can be seen in Figure Two, only 13 Member 
States contribute to the second CSDP mission, there is close cooperation with the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and the African Union 
whereby all Member States of the EU cooperate and are involved. The willingness to 
cooperate among multiple actors in the region shows the importance of peace and stability 
                                                          
10 EEAS. 2015b. EUCAP Sahel Mali [Online]. Available: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eucap-
sahel-mali_fr [Accessed 24 July 2018]. 
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in Mali to the international community and it highlights EU CSDP missions as having a regional 
and multilateral dimension.  
This thesis will begin with a literature review of the relevant key concepts that will be 
highlighted in this research followed by the theoretical conceptualization that the research 
will focus on. This research’s theoretical conceptualization is based on Chris Hill’s 1993 
Capabilities-Expectations Gap where Hill identified a significant gap between what the EU was 
expected to do and what it was actually able to deliver. This gap will be considered within the 
research question to determine whether such a gap still exists or if it has evolved into more 
of a Consensus-Expectations Gap as Toje (2008) has suggested in his academic works. The 
next section will outline the methodologies chosen to answer the research question followed 
by the empirical findings of the research question. The last section will discuss the findings 
before the concluding remarks with recommendations for enhancing peacekeeping 
capabilities in the future. 
Ultimately this research shall analyse the content of the 2016 European Union Global Strategy 
and the 2016-2017 Common Security and Defence Policy Annual Reports of the two ongoing 
missions in Mali; EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. This analysis will evaluate the mission’s 
progression and determine whether the 2016 EU Global Strategy has had an influence on 
mandates of the two ongoing missions.  
This research aims to answer two sub questions which are key determinants of success in the 
two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali; 
1. Has the EU accounted for the security-development nexus in Mali? 










CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the not so distant past the EU was described as “an economic giant, a political dwarf, and 
a military worm” by the Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens (Whitney, 1991 11). Since 
then, it has been argued by many scholars (Smith, 2005, Manners, 2006, Faleg, 2016, Tardy, 
2018, Pohl, 2013, Biscop and Coelmont, 2017) that the EU has the capacity to deploy a 
sizeable expeditionary force to any CSDP mission. 2003 marked an innovative era for the EU 
as Member States showed a new willingness for collective action in crisis management which 
has resulted in the deployment of over 30 civilian and military operations globally within the 
framework of the CSDP (formally known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)) 
(Nováky, 2011). . This review will firstly outline the introduction of peacebuilding policies both 
within the EU and on the global stage and the EU’s role as a global actor. CSDP is the key focus 
of this research and incorporates what is internationally known as the peacebuilding process 
-the nexus between security and development – otherwise understood as the EU’s 
comprehensive approach and the EU identity as a global security actor. Secondly, focus on 
how the relevant literature discussed significant challenges faced by CSDP namely the lack of 
political will and burden-sharing of international crises and the impact of militarisation on the 
nature of the EU. The argument that European defence transformation remains incomplete 
will be analysed in this review in addition to the central aspects of CSDP. 
Merlingen (2012) has highlighted the EU’s former role as a security receiver evolving into a 
security provider, now being a “recognised and sought-after security actor”. Merlingen (2012) 
shows the history of the EU and its Member States during the World Wars as being reliant on 
outside actors to provide security but portrays the EU’s evolution into becoming an efficient 
security provider as key to the success of CSDP. Since its inception in 2003, the operations 
conducted under CSDP have been especially active on the African continent (Merket et al., 
2015). Mali is the only country in the world to have two ongoing CSDP missions; EUCAP Sahel 
Mali and EUTM Mali. This is a result of the political and social instability in the region which 
has seen a demand in crisis management operations throughout the Sahel, North Africa and 
the Horn of Africa (Merket et al., 2015).  
In order to offer an overview of relevant literature, this chapter will analyse key concepts and 
challenges that face the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy. Catherine 
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Ashton, the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy and the 
first Vice-President of the European Commission stated in 2013, 
We cannot succeed without this comprehensive approach – it is simply not enough to 
chase and deter pirates, not enough to try and do development when there is no 
security, not enough to try provide economic support without a stable government 
(Merket et al., 2015).  
This statement incorporates many of the key concepts of CSDP and the desire of the EU to 
strive towards becoming a more effective global security actor, held accountable for the 
previous limitations the ESDP faced. This thesis aims to analyse CSDP in Mali to determine 
whether new and changing policies and strategies released by the EU have an impact on the 
mission’s mandates and activities on the ground. 
2.1 Formulating Peacebuilding Policies 
Galtung (1975) was the first to introduce the concept of peacebuilding. He emphasised the 
need to “promote sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflicts and 
supporting indigenous capabilities for post conflict management” (Galtung et al., 1975 153). 
This concept was then redefined by former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutrous 
Ghali (1992) who introduced peacebuilding to the UN in his Agenda for Peace. Article 50 
defined peacebuilding as “comprehensive efforts…[and an] action to identify and support 
structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict 
(Ghali, 1992 823)”. 
The importance of peacebuilding has been acknowledged in the Brahimi Report as “integral 
to the success of peacekeeping operations” (Kmec, 2015 2). This acknowledgement has been 
adopted by the UN Security Council through the Report of the Panel of UN Peace Operations, 
which highlights the concept of peacebuilding as crucial to international peace and security 
(Gross, 2013 1). This concept is as significant to the EU as it is within the UN system because 
of the EU’s commitment to reaching the Global Goals, laid out by the UN, by 2030. 
It has been highlighted by many scholars (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006, Atack, 2005, 
Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, Wouters et al., 2010) that peacebuilding has become one of the 
major elements of the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. Atack (2005) and Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000) define peacebuilding as a form of post-conflict management that addresses 
the root causes of a conflict with the aim of preventing the relapse into conflict. The 
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peacebuilding activities undertaken by the EU in their CSDP missions and operations have 
predominantly been post-conflict in the areas of training, capacity-building, legal advice, rule 
of law, disarmament and policing (Kmec, 2015 14). The peacebuilding activities mentioned 
above are especially prevalent in Mali as they aim to have a multidimensional approach in 
order to have the biggest possible impact to address the regional and national issues Mali 
faces. CSDP missions and operations are a key tool of the EU for promoting peacebuilding and 
have shown the EU’s importance in this space through the amount of operations being 
conducted around the world.  
The UN has influenced the EU’s support for peacebuilding through the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine and the concept of human security (Gross, 2013 1-3). The EU’s CSDP missions 
and their interpretation of peacebuilding has been complementary to efforts undertaken by 
UN peacekeeping forces; they have “filled the gap and strengthened the impact of the UN 
without deploying directly to UN operations” (Juergenliemk et al., 2013 20). The tools most 
predominantly used by the EU for peacebuilding, such as “facilitating mediation, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation” (Whitman and Wolff, 2012 3), are key for the 
efficiency of CSDP.  
Peacebuilding policies are essential to all CSDP missions. The EU focuses on peacebuilding 
tools such as facilitating mediation, conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation which 
are key features of CSDP (Whitman and Wolff, 2012). These features are visible in Mali, where 
the EU has implemented a range of peacebuilding tools to ensure stability is maintained so 
the Sahel region can subsequently enjoy the lasting stability. Martin and Kaldor (2009) have 
focused on the impact of CSDP looking at potential ways to enhance human security through 
the peacebuilding initiatives exercised within CSDP. The recommendation from their study 
was to ensure the EU was aware that “human security encompasses EU concepts of conflict 
prevention, crisis management and civil-military coordination” (Martin and Kaldor, 2009 17). 
They suggested that the EU needs to embed human security training and policies into their 
CSDP missions, promoting their values of good governance and human rights. By 
incorporating these measures, the EU would significantly enhance their peacebuilding 




2.2 The EU as a global security actor and the “comprehensive approach” 
Many scholars have focused on the EU’s development as an international global security actor 
(Ulriksen et al., 2004, Gegout, 2005, Čadková, 2012, Germond and Smith, 2009, Smith, 2003, 
Helly and Galeazzi, 2013, Piccolino, 2010, Simon et al., 2012, Manners, 2002). CSDP missions 
and operations are well-known today as a result of the development of the EU’s security 
actorness (Nowak, 2006, Wouters et al., 2010, Tardy, 2017). Scholars have identified the EU’s 
global security actorness as part of its comprehensive approach, highlighting the EU as a 
multilateral organisation with a range of resources and tools to support its external action. 
Snijders (2015), emphasises the need for the EU to adopt a multidimensional approach by 
comprehensively utilizing these range of tools. In relation to the EU’s comprehensive 
approach in the Sahel region, where this research is focused, Snijders noted that; 
The EU set up a crisis response strategy consisting of various tools: political dialogue, 
civilian and military security capacities, development cooperation and humanitarian 
assistance… Mali’s Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly, spoke of the ‘multi-form 
assistance’ of the EU (Snijders, 2015 44). 
The EU has shown that it can use all tools at its disposal in dealing with international crises to 
show its global security actorness. The comprehensive approach is just one tool of many to 
demonstrate this and is one that will be returned to throughout this research paper. 
In addition to the comprehensive approach being used as a tool to show global security 
actorness, the EU also works closely with other international and regional partners to 
promote effective multilateralism when dealing with crises. The EU recognises the UN 
Security Council as the most responsible for upholding international peace and security which 
makes cooperation natural between the EU and UN as they are complementary partners in 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations (Kmec, 2015 11). The 2003 European Council 
Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was the first formal 
recognition of this partnership followed by the 2007 Joint Statement for further cooperation 
in certain areas (Revelas, 2013 78). Cooperation with the UN and other international and 
regional partners is a central element to EU external action. 
One of the most identified scholar’s theories of the EU as a global actor has been Ian Manners 
theory of Normative Power Europe. Manner’s main argument is that the EU “possesses a 
normative power that is built on norms such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and 
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respect for human rights” (Manners, 2002). He discusses the EU as a normative power shaping 
its international actorness role through what it actually is and what it aims to promote as 
highlighted above. 
However, Gamble and Lane (2009) and Hughes (2013) are critical of the EU as an effective 
global actor and portray the EU’s role in a different light to previously mentioned scholars. 
Asseburg and Kempin (2009) highlight previous critiques of the EU as a global actor and 
expose the ineffectiveness of CSDP by stating that: 
CSDP deployments to date represent little more than symbolic gestures. Only in five 
out of twenty-three cases has the EU deployed more than one thousand staff. Nine 
civilian missions even had less than one hundred staff. In 2008 about six thousand 
military personnel were involved in military operations, representing just 0.4 percent 
of the operational military capacity of the twenty-seven EU Member States (Asseburg 
and Kempin, 2009 11). 
The EU’s comprehensive approach in the Sahel region has been largely successful thus far due 
to a range of factors including the significant amount of political will lead by the French. These 
factors have been highlighted by several scholars (Okemuo, 2013, Tardy, 2016, Merket et al., 
2015). The Sahel region is where EU external action is especially visible due to similar interests 
in the region by some of the EU’s Member States (Okemuo, 2013 236). Helly and Galeazzi 
(2013 11) have praised the EU’s efforts in the Sahel region saying that the Sahel Strategy is 
“good practise for the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis”. The EU’s 
comprehensive approach is still a work in progress. As stressed in Briscoe and Ginkel’s (2013) 
article about the nexus between security and development, more work needs to be done to 
improve its effectiveness including formulating stronger cooperation between development 
and security actions. This nexus will be at the forefront of research on CSDP in Mali as it is 
essential to any CSDP mission and has had a significant impact on the achievements of the 
mandate in the EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) and EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Mali. 
2.3 The nexus between security and development 
Tardy (2015b 1) in his European Union Institute for Security Studies article highlights that 
there is “a clear link between the security situation of a country on the one hand and the 
implementation and progress of sustainable development on the other hand”. Several 
scholars (Merket, 2012, Amer et al., 2012, Carbone, 2013, Furness and Gänzle, 2017, Briscoe 
and Van Ginkel, 2013) have explained the process where policy-makers have come to realise 
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that connection between security and development policies is not only inevitable but should 
inform and guide policy decisions. The EU, and many other international organisations and 
countries, have committed to integrate development and security policies which has now 
become known as the security-development nexus. 
The security-development nexus has been at the heart of the CSDP missions and operations, 
especially in the Sahel region. Okemuo (2013) highlights the key strategies and documents of 
the EU that recognise the security-development nexus, namely the 2011 Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel. Mali, Mauritania and Niger are the three core Sahel countries 
where the Strategy focuses. The previous initiatives in the region have led to the creation of 
the Sahel Strategy following the 2002 Cairo Action Plan and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(Okemuo, 2013 225). The Cotonou Agreement is the principle instrument regulating the EU’s 
actions with Sub-Saharan Africa which includes Mali. This agreement has security and 
development cooperation incorporated and commits both the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa to 
pursing these objectives (Amer et al., 2012).  
Tardy (2015a) and Merket et. al (2015) have portrayed fresh debates in their works to 
determine the best way to combine security activities and the long-term development of 
states. CSDP was one of the central factors in this debate and some of the issues associated 
with security and development have been highlighted in the article. Tardy (2017 35) wrote: 
Problematic about the combination of development cooperation and security policies 
is the fact that both fields are based on different legal bases and therefore are 
conducted by different actors and decision makers. 
CSDP in Mali focuses on capacity-building for security and development (Merket et al., 2015). 
Extending on the ‘Train and Equip’ concept, the EU’s aims in Mali are to put the country in a 
position to “prevent and manage crises themselves” (Merket et al., 2015 27). Problematic to 
this, as Tardy (2017) has quoted above, is the fact that the fields operate under different legal 
basis. For example, recent experiences with CSDP training missions in Mali have shown that 
in many cases lasting and effective results are not achieved due to a lack of basic equipment 
in the partner country. The limited budget for CSDP does not cover lethal equipment and 
therefore prevents the shortages of footwear, uniforms, vehicles etc, in Mali to be funded 
through the EU. Without this basic equipment the mission cannot achieve its mandate and 
has to turn to other external financing instruments such as “the Financial Instrument for 
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Development Cooperation, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and the 
European Development Fund”(Merket et al., 2015).  
The relationship between security and development has been incorporated into several 
recent EU publications such as the 2007 Council Conclusions on Security and Development 
(Union, 2007) and the 2011 Agenda for Change (Union, 2011). Despite the strategies and 
efforts undertaken by the EU to link long-term development and peacebuilding to security, 
scholars have criticised that efforts being made are not consistent with the promises being 
made in the above documents (Gaulme, 2014). This thesis aims to look at the 2016 European 
Union Global Strategy, using Mali as a case study, to determine whether these ambitions laid 
out in the Global Strategy are being translated into action on the ground. Key scholars 
(Gaulme, 2014, Briscoe and Van Ginkel, 2013, Merket, 2012) have attributed this shortfall to 
the fact that; 
Security means different things to different people. Priorities for different actors range 
from fighting the threat of separatism to curbing the global menace of violent 
extremism or limiting illegal migration (Gaulme, 2014 1). 
Therefore, although many scholars agree that the EU has recognised the security-
development nexus (Amer et al., 2012, Carbone, 2013, Furness and Gänzle, 2017, Briscoe and 
Van Ginkel, 2013, Merket, 2012) they also highlight the need for the EU to link the 
development cooperation and security policies within their institution more effectively. 
Within the Sahel region this focus on development cooperation and security policies is most 
evident. The Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is the foundation upon which 
EU action in this area is taken.  
2.4 Challenges faced by CSDP: The concept of burden-sharing and the need for political will 
Burden-sharing has been a widely studied subject in the field of International Relations (IR) 
but there is little research into burden-sharing in the context of CSDP missions and operations 
(Dorussen et al., 2009). Novaky (2011 18) is one scholar who has found the lack of studies into 
burden-sharing and CSDP missions and operations surprising, he has concluded that “EU 
Member States have participated in CSDP military operations due to a variety of interests and 
pressures”. The first scholars to focus on burden-sharing as a concept were Forster and 
Cimbala (2005) with their book The US, NATO and military burden-sharing.  They define 
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burden-sharing as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the 
process of accomplishing a common goal. The risks may be economic, political, military or 
other” (Cimbala and Forster, 2005 9).  The concept of burden-sharing traces back to the Cold 
War where the United States and European allies debated over who should contribute what 
and how much to the Atlantic Alliance.  
Forster and Cimbala (2005) discuss the risks of a country not accepting burden-sharing which 
are relevant to EU Member States and CSDP missions. They state that; 
A country which decides not to accept the responsibilities of collective actions risks 
losing influence over the crisis at hand and may suffer longer-term negative 
international relations…The risks of failed intervention, in contrast to non-
involvement, also are great especially when vital interests are not at stake. Failed 
intervention may result in damaged international prestige, a decreased willingness 
and potentially, capability to respond to new threats emerging from regional 
hegemons who contribute to instabilities (Cimbala and Forster, 2005 155). 
Burden-sharing is inevitable for a CSDP mission due to their reliance on Member States 
contribution to provide economic, political and military resources. As a result, several scholars 
have begun to look at the factors that influence Member States to undertake a new CSDP 
mission and the inherited burden that comes with it (Howorth, 2014, Čadková, 2012, Peters, 
2010, Knutsen, 2011, Nováky, 2011, Tardy, 2015a, Merlingen, 2012).  
Merlingen (2012) focuses on the factors a Member State chooses not to contribute to a 
mission and highlights political will as the most significant factor. He writes that; 
The CSDP relies on the voluntary pooling of national manpower and capabilities and 
the convergence of national political will. It works well in cases in which EU 
governments share similar views of security threats and challenges they face and 
when they agree that the CSDP is the best tool to tackle them. In cases where such 
cross national convergence of views is absent, the CSDP becomes a paper tiger 
(Merlingen, 2012 4-5). 
Therefore, although CSDP missions and operations are an important tool of external action 
for the EU, they also show the limits of what the EU and its members are willing to do to make 
the world more secure (Tardy, 2015a). The political will of Member States differs depending 
on the CSDP operation or mission, the reasons being are that Member States have limited 
political will in certain CSDP missions or operations where the missions lack “relevance to 
their national security” (Mattelaer, 2008, Piccolino, 2010).  
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In the case of the Sahel region, where this study focuses, political will is not an issue as the 
EU’s interests are significant for ongoing CSDP missions. Simon, Mattalaer and Hadfield (2012 
4) in their article A Coherent Strategy for the Sahel, identify the region as key to EU’s energy 
security and management of migration flows which helps Europe fight against illegal drugs 
and trafficking. Van Dorpe (2014 1) explicitly states if the EU wants “stable and secure 
neighbours, it needs to ensure stability and security in the Sahel region”. This highlights the 
reasons for Member States to contribute to the missions in the Sahel region and one of the 
major factors for EU intervention in the Sahel region. 
What is missing from many debates surrounding political will and burden-sharing is the post-
colonial responsibility often felt by certain Member States. Few scholars address this issue. 
Coolsaet et al. (2013) was among the first to question France’s interests in EU’s external 
actions for the Sahel region. The article goes as far to describe European involvement in the 
region as “a unilateral French, and not EU initiative” (Coolsaet et al., 2013 2).  Other scholars 
such as Matlary (2009) have previously examined the role of France and the concept of 
national-interest in CSDP missions but very few have specifically focused on the ongoing Sahel 
missions and operations. This thesis will highlight the significant role of France as an actor in 
Mali by demonstrating their strategic interests and the power of the Member State to 
mobilise the entire EU to act.  
2.5 Militarisation of CSDP and the impact on the nature of the EU 
The European Security and Defence Policy, renamed CSDP under the Lisbon Treaty, was 
initially created as predominantly a military activity. The Saint-Malo Joint Declaration on 
European Defence stated that ESDP was “anchored in the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy, having the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
national crises” (Summit, 1998 3). Although the EU has built its military muscles and has a 
sizeable expeditionary force there is a growing amount of scholars who criticise the EU in their 
attempts to deliver practical progress in capability and improvement schemes (Menon, 2009, 
Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2006 
, Faleg, 2016, Nowak, 2006, Tardy, 2018).  Faleg (2016) argues that the defence dimeson of 
the CSDP is largely underdeveloped and describes EU characteristics in CSDP missions and 
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operations as more of a civilian power rather than military. This claim is supported by a 
number of other scholars who analyse the non-use of the potential power of European forces 
(Merlingen, 2012, Merket et al., 2015, Tardy, 2018, Andersson, 2016). Merket et al. (2015 81) 
highlight the fact that the EU Battlegroups and the permanent military rapid-reaction units 
created in 2007 have not been used despite the potential need for action in crises such as the 
coup in Mali or civil war in other parts of Africa. Merlingen (2012 177-183) criticises the EU 
and its Member States for only having “10-20% of European armed forces deployable in 
stabilization and reconstruction…Europeans still have over 10,000 battle tanks in their 
armouries”.  
The Franco-British Summit had an ambition for the EU to move away from its “civilian” and 
“normative” power status, but it also introduced questions on the impact of militarisation on 
the nature of the EU (Simón, 2010, Manners, 2006). Despite these questions, scholars 
continue to argue that the CSDP remains predominantly of a civilian nature (Pohl, 2013, Faleg, 
2016, Tardy, 2017). Pohl (2013 310) argues that most Member States are not willing in reality 
to allow the EU to practice the defence role that was intended for it through previous policy 
documents and treaties. The defence dimeson of the CSDP is most challenged because of the 
diverging views of Member States and because Member States are not willing to deploy their 
military personnel into risky environments (Keukeleire, 2009 57).  
However, recent key developments in the EU’s Security and Defence policies have 
demonstrated a desire to rebalance the EU’s defensive role within CSDP. Tardy (2018 ), in 
support of Biscop and Coelmont’s (2017) article CSDP and the ‘Ghent Framework’: The Indirect 
Approach to Permanent Structured Cooperation?, evaluates the development of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) launched by the EU in 2017. He describes PESCO 
as; 
A framework aimed at incentivising cooperation among Member States in the field of 
defence capability development and operations. The PESCO framework includes two 
components: binding commitments and specific projects. Binding commitments are 
pledges made by Member States in the field of defence spending, capability 
development, and availability and deployability of forces (Tardy, 2018 9). 
In addition to the launch of PESCO, Tardy (2018 9) also evaluates the “Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability (MPCC) which was established in June 2017 as the permanent strategic-
level headquarter for non-executive military missions”. Tardy highlights the key reasons the 
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MPCC being established as “the identification of a specific need, the momentum generated 
by the release of the European Union Global Strategy, and the UK’s decision to leave the EU” 
(Tardy, 2018). New processes and the launch of PESCO and MPCC shown the EU’s renewed 
interest in ensuring defence is incorporated effectively into CSDP missions. More research 
needs to be done on the potential militarisation impact on the nature of the EU given these 
recent developments. Critics of these processes and developments still don’t see the EU’s 
ability to become a stronger military power in their CSDP missions and operations (Merlingen, 
2012, Menon, 2009, Tardy, 2018). But the EU is committing to a stronger role in defence with 
the release of PESCO and MPCC and monitoring the impact of this on the nature of the EU 
will be a new field of study for many scholars. 
2.6 Gaps in the Literature 
After analysing over sixty sources relating to concepts of the CSDP and the challenges the 
policy faces, there was one particular gap in the literature that was evident. Merket et al. 
(2015) identified this gap most effectively in their article The EU as a global security actor in 
Africa. The gap is surrounding the EU’s promotion of regionalism in Africa and issues that can 
potentially impact a CSDP mission when African troops are contributed. Within the UN there 
already exists an African Standby Force which was created in 2016 (Merket et al., 2015 12). 
This issue is further expanded upon in the article; 
A political issue identified with this is the fact that African troops are usually deployed 
in neighbouring countries; this is the case in Somalia, the DRC, Mali and the CAR. This 
may have advantages, but such a deployment often has additional political and/or 
economic dimensions in support of national interests. These factors increase a 
mission’s complexity and undermine its neutrality (Merket et al., 2015 12). 
Relations between the EU and Africa has never been without difficulties, but there is a need 
for increased dialogue to promote and incorporate regionalism in CSDP missions and 
operations keeping in mind the inherent issues that may come with increased regionalism as 
mentioned above. Not enough research has been conducted surrounding the African Union’s 
role in CSDP missions being undertaken in the region, and this is the predominant gap that 
was found in the literature in this review. Due to limitations this research will not be focusing 
heavily on the role of the African Union in the two missions in Mali, as more research needs 




In summary, this review provides an overview of relevant literature about the EU CSDP and 
its key concepts and challenges. This topic has been analysed by several key scholars in the 
field (Nováky, 2011, Tardy, 2018, Merket et al., 2015, Manners, 2006, Biscop and Coelmont, 
2017, Simón, 2010, Faleg, 2016);have focused on key concepts on the CSDP including the 
peacebuilding process, the nexus between security and development, the EU’s 
comprehensive approach and the EU identity as a global actor. These scholars also provide 
analytical literature surrounding the core challenges that the EU CSDP faces currently and will 
continue to face in the future which are the lack of political will and burden-sharing of 
international crises and the impact of militarisation on the nature of the EU. 
Since 2003, the EU’s CSDP has made significant progress to achieve objectives but there are 
still important improvements to be made. The lack of scholarly literature surrounding 
regionalism and the role of the African Union in ongoing CSDP missions throughout the region 
has resulted in a significant gap which needs to be addressed before the Union and its 




CHAPTER 3 – THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
The theoretical approach used in this thesis is Chris Hill’s Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The 
reason for choosing this theoretical approach is the criticism of the EU that it does not deliver 
consistently given the state of its economic system and the resources at its disposal, 
institutionally and politically. Hill’s theory was intended to be used as a yardstick by which the 
process of change within EU foreign policy could be monitored. The change in recent policy 
documents, the release of the EUGS in particular, gives this research the opportunity to 
determine whether the Capability-Expectations Gap still exists or whether it has narrowed 
significantly due to the influence of the EUGS on specific CSDP missions. 
 In 1993, Chris Hill published an influential article defining the gap through three main 
components; the EU’s ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its disposal (Hill, 
1993). Hill analysed the European Community (EC), now known as the EU, based on its 
international role and identified a gap between what the EU has been expected to do and 
what it is actually able to deliver (Hill, 1993). The article’s aim was to “sketch a more realistic 
picture of what the Community does in the world than that presented either by its more 
enthusiastic supporters or by the demanders beyond its borders” (Hill, 1993 306). 
With this, Hill posed the question: “If the EC is less than a state but more than an IGO, in what 
ways can it be termed a genuinely independent actor in international relations?” (Hill, 1993 
309). The focus of his theory centred around the international role the EU had in 1993 and 
what it may or may not be expected to perform in the Post-Cold War era (Hill, 2004 726). Two 
key concepts are presented in the creation of Hill’s theory being actorness and presence. Hill 
highlights three features of an international actor as being “delimited from others, 
autonomous as it can make its own laws and decisions and retains some structural 
prerequisites for action on an international level such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic 
agents and the capacity to negotiate with third parties” (Hill, 1993 309). The other concept of 
presence has been defined as the EU’s “variable and multidimensional presence” ( 309) on 
the global stage, which see’s EU norms and values being promoted wherever the EU is 
present. 
In theorising the EU as an international actor, the concept of multilateralism should be 
engaged with. The EU has committed itself to effective multilateralism through numerous 
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joint communication and resolutions with the United Nations (UN). In 2003, the EU desired 
to have; 
An active commitment to an effective multilateralism [that] means more than a 
rhetoric profession of faith. It means taking global rules seriously, whether they 
concern the preservation of peace or the limitation of carbon emissions; it means 
helping other countries to implement and abide by these rules; it means engaging 
actively in multilateral forums, and promoting a forward-looking agenda that is not 
limited to a narrow defence of national interests (Commission, 2003 2). 
This thesis will analyse whether the external action and international actorness of the EU is 
influenced by the releasing of new EU policies and strategies. Using the EUGS, this thesis aims 
to focus on the two ongoing CSDP missions in Mali to determine whether the EUGS has had 
an influence on their activities and mandates. 
The Capabilities-Expectations Gap identified in Hill’s works also proposed some of the 
potential dangers of this gap as being an “excessive risk-taking by supplicant states and/or 
unrealistic policies on behalf of the EU” (Hill, 1993 315) which possibly produces a 
“disproportionate degree of disillusion and resentment when hopes were inevitably dashed” 
(Hill, 1997 8). This thesis argues that these dangers still exist in EU foreign policy today despite 
the evolvement in policy, institutions and ability to promote actorness on the global stage. 
In his first 1993 article, Hill divided his analysis into two parts; the functions the EU performed 
to the present and six functions it might be expected to have in the future. The expected 
future functions were listed as; 
1. The EU as a superpower, replacing the USSR in the global balance of power; 
2. A regional pacifier; 
3. A global intervener; 
4. A mediator of conflicts; 
5. A bridge between the rich and the poor; 
6. Joint supervisor of the world economy (Hill, 1993 310-314) 
The above tasks, according to Hill in 1993, posed a serious challenge to what the EC (what the 
EU was previously known as) was actually capable of delivering due to the three central 
components to his theory highlighted above. However, the development of the EU overtime 
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institutionally and policy-wise, has narrowed the Capabilities-Expectations Gap significantly. 
The EU has made efforts to improve its resource availability, as well as to the instruments at 
its disposal but it will be argued in this thesis that Chris Hill’s theory of the Capabilities-
Expectations Gap still offers great explanatory power despite being first introduced in 1993. 
This research will specifically focus on whether his claim of the gap continues to exist despite 
the introduction of the CSDP and institutional strengthening such as the creation of the 
European Union External Action Service (EEAS), to name a few examples. 
The EU has made significant developments since this theory was first introduced in 1993. 
Despite Hill’s theory being based on a constructivist ontology, he recognises that the reality 
of EU action is changeable even though the process may be slow. Hill identifies historical 
developments as being “much slower than impatient and idealists would wish” (Hill, 1993 
315). Some of these key developments since Hill’s theory was introduced include the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the foreign policy presence under the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) which later became known as CSDP under the 2003 European Security 
Strategy (ESS), the creation of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the 
establishment of the European External Action Service, and the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon.  
Hill himself noted in 1993 that the experience of EU foreign policy had “been so unique that 
the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail and that we must fall back 
on history” (Hill, 1993 307). Therefore, it is important to understand different theorist’s 
conceptualizations of international actorness of the EU over the years following Hill’s 
conceptualization. One of the leading ideas of the past decade has been Ian Manner’s theory 
of normative power Europe. Manner’s argues that the EU “possessed a normative power that 
is built on norms such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights” 
(Manners, 2002). Manner’s therefore discusses the EU as a normative power shaping its 
international actorness role through what it actually is. In his 2002 theoretical 
conceptualization, Manners points out that; 
The EU has a normative power that has an ontological quality to it – that the EU can 
be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist 
quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a 
normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms in the international 
system (Manners, 2002 252). 
It is widely agreed that the EU favours promoting common liberal-democratic principles as 
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outlined above in Manner’s article. This thesis will focus on what the EU is, as suggested by 
Manners, and it will go further to look at what the EU actually does, as Karen. E Smith has 
argued. Smith agrees with Hill and Manners in their theoretical conceptualizes of EU 
international actorness but goes further by relying not only on what the EU is, but she 
examines what the EU does (Smith, 2005). Through Smiths argument of looking at actions of 
the EU, we are naturally led back to Hill’s theory of Capability-Expectations Gap as acting 
when it comes to international affairs is where the EU is most frequently challenged by the 
international community.  
Toje has been the most recent scholar to analyse Hill’s theory and narrow what is commonly 
known as Hill’s Capability-Expectations Gap. Toje (2008) argues that the EU, based on Hill’s 
three components of his theory, does have the resources and instruments to act but still 
“finds itself unable to deliver the foreign policies expected due to a lack of decision making” 
( 122) and the ability to agree. He believes there is more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap 
which means there is a gap between what the Member States are expected to agree on in 
foreign policy and what they can actually consent to. This recent analysis of the gap that exists 
in EU foreign policy has been argued to result in the EU being unable to engage in effective 
crisis management and resorting to continuing statements and examples rather than shaping 
world affairs (Toje, 2008 139).  
It should be noted that Hill, in his recent assessments of his theory, has stressed that his 
Capability-Expectations Gap was never intended as a static theory, but “rather a yardstick by 
which the process of change in EU foreign policy could be monitored” (Toje, 2008 122). 
Therefore, this thesis will centralise around Hill’s 1993 Capability-Expectations Gap to 
determine whether the gap still exists in current CSDP missions or whether it has narrowed 
into more of a Consensus-Expectations Gap as argued by Toje in 2008. The aim of this thesis 
is to determine whether the ambitions of future EU external action laid out in the 2016 EUGS 







3.1 Methodology Introduction 
This section includes the research methodology of this thesis. This section will outline the the 
research methods, the research approach, the selected methods for collecting data, case 
study selection and the research limitiations. To reitterate the research question this thesis 
aims to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports to 
determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP operations. In order 
to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to understand if and how 
new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations. 
The timeframe for this research is from the release of the EUGS in June 2016 until June 2018, 
2 years post the release of the EUGS. The reason for this choice is to ensure that there has 
been sufficient time for the EU and its Member States to make progress on the ambitions of 
the EUGS and to allow for the release of two Annual CSDP Reports to determine whether the 
mandates have been influenced over the past two years. 
Before outlining the rest of this section the distinction between ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ 
should be made clear. Henn et al (2009) states that “method refers to the range of techniques 
that are avaliable to us to collect evidence about the social world. Methodology, however, 
concerns the research strategy as a whole” ( 3).  
3.2 Research method – Qualitative versus Quantitative techniques 
A predominantly qualitative approach to this research question was taken in order to meet 
objectives of the research question. Qualitative research is appropriate for small samples and 
offers a detailed description of a research subject “without limiting the scope of the research 
and nature of participant’s responses” (Collis and Hussy, 2003). Qualitative research is defined 
as “the interpretative study of a specified issue or problem in which the researcher is central 
to the sense that is made” (Cassell, 1994 2).  
Figure Three shows the features of qualitative and quantitative research. Most of the 
outcomes of qualitative research come from the researcher’s personal judgements and 
interpretations therefore the effectiveness of this method relies on the skills and abilities of 
the researcher.  
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A quantitative approach was also used purely to gather term frequency throughout the 
content analysis of the EUGS and CSDP Annual Reports. This approach was chosen to further 
show the impact the EUGS has had on the mandates of the two missions in Mali. This 
quantitative approach was using word clouds generated from a sophisticated site called 
Wordle12. A word cloud generator such as Wordle takes words from the content the 
researcher has provided and creates a cloud that is a visual representation of the frequency 
certain words have in the content provided.  Wordle is one of the most popular word cloud 
generators and creates a clean and well organised cloud that helps conduct a clear visual 
representation of words (Burch et al., 2013). The predominant reason for choosing Wordle is 
the promotion of the site from several well-known Non-Governmental Organisations who use 
                                                          
11 Adapted from: MILES, M. B., HUBERMAN, A. M., HUBERMAN, M. A. & HUBERMAN, M. 1994. Qualitative 
data analysis: An expanded sourcebook, Sage., 40. 
12 http://www.wordle.net/ [Accessed 01 August 2018] 
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the site on their own websites such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Human Rights 
Watch. 
Qualitative research was chosen for this research to provide an in-depth explanation of the 
research question. Qualitative research is primarily exploratory research. In this research it 
was used to gain an understanding of the context and complexity of the EU’s CSDP structure 
and focused on the words rather than numbers as is more typical for a quantitative approach. 
This research has used qualitative content analysis to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy 
and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports and has tagged key phrases and text segments that 
correspond to key concepts in the research question. 
3.3 Research approach: Inductive or deductive  
The research approach that was followed for the purposes of this research was a deductive 
one. The deductive approach means the researcher starts with theory, applying a chosen 
theory to something the researcher chooses to study. In doing so, the researcher defines and 
operationalises variables derived from the theory.  
Gulati states that “deductive means reasoning from the particular to the general. If a causal 
relationship or link seems to be implied by a particular theory or case example, it might be 
true in many cases. A deductive design might test to see if this relationship or link did obtain 
on more general circumstances” (Gulati, 2009 42). The objective of a deductive research 
approach is to test or verify rather than develop the theory, it is grounded in the theory 
process. This research question best suits the deductive approach. CSDP has had a significant 
amount of attention from scholars since it was introduced in 2003. This attention has resulted 
in numerous amounts of academic sources being published on the topic which is the key 
reason for this research being deductive. 
By applying deductive research, this thesis will explore a known theory and test if the theory 
is valid in given circumstances. The deductive approach “follows the path of logic most 
closely” (Pellissier, 2008 3), and it has three key advantages; 
1. Possibility to explain causal relationships between concepts and variables 
2. Possibility to measure concepts quantitatively 
3. Possibility to generalize research findings to a certain extent 
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Therefore, to get the most accurate answer to this theses research question, the deductive 
approach will be most efficient. 
3.4 Data collection method and tools 
For the purposes of this research, qualitative content analysis and case studies were used as 
data collection methods. Krippendorff defines content analysis as “analysis of the manifest 
and latent content of a body of communicated material (as a book or film) through 
classification, tabulation and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain 
its meaning and probable effect” (Krippendorff, 2004 xvii). The method of content analysis 
has become adaptable to suit the unique needs of the researcher and their research question 
and can be applied in quantitative, qualitative and sometimes mixed methods research 
approaches. The range of techniques within content analysis is extensive and it has become 
one of the most common methods used in the social sciences (White and Marsh, 2006 23).  
Krippendorff highlights in four key points how to successfully apply content analysis as a 
method in research; 
1. “Sample text, in the sense of selecting what is relevant; 
2. Unitize text, in the sense of distinguishing words or propositions and using quotes and 
examples; 
3. Contextualize what is being read in light of what is known about the circumstances 
surrounding the text; 
4. Have specific research questions in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004 87). 
The content analysis used in this research broke down the data, from the EUGS and 2016-
2017 CSDP Annual Reports, according to source topic and used a concept-driven deductive 
strategy which drew on the context of the research question.  
In Krippendorff’s (2004) works he states that “content analysis is an empirically grounded 
method, explanatory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent” ( xvii). Content analysis 
undertaken in this research focused on two key documents and examined the data and 
focused on the “aboutness” of the content, as suggested in Neundorf’s Content Analysis 
Guidebook (Neuendorf, 2002). For example, this research focused on how often a particular 
word, phrase or concept was used or not used and the themes and trends in the documents.  
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The reliability of this method is dependent upon the agreement, or the extent of agreement, 
that is made among others who have analysed the text (Krippendorff, 2004). The use of 
content analysis in this research was effective in analysing the presence of certain words or 
concepts within the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports. This 
research analysed the presence, meaning and relationships of such words and concepts in 
order to answer the research question. This research focused on a particular segment within 
the content and gathered evidence to prove whether this segment has been translated into 
action on the ground within the CSDP mission. 
This research also used case studies as a method. The case study research method can be 
defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984 23). Case studies have 
become a more popular method in research because of the limitations of quantitative 
research in providing in depth explanations of research questions. Case study method allows 
a researcher to gain an in-depth study closely examining data in a specific context. In most 
research contexts, a case study method is limited to a small geographic area or number of 
individuals as the subject of study. Yin (1984), discusses the advantages of using case study 
method in research as being able to examine data within the context of its use and provide 
an in-depth study of a single or small number of cases, set in their real world contexts ( 21).  
There are different designs of case study research, the most common being comparing a large 
number of cases, known as large-n comparison, or comparing a smaller number of cases or a 
single case, referred to as a small-n approach to research. This research will be a small-n 
approach as it contrasts two case studies in the same geographical location, Mali. By 
conducting small-n research on two cases, this research resulted in a deeper understanding 
of the problem analysed in the research question.  
3.5 Case Study selection 
Choosing a case study design to answer the research question, two ongoing case studies were 
selected; EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Selection criteria was based on the EU’s strategic 
priorities for regions that have ongoing CSDP missions. The Sahel region has often been 
highlighted as a region of strategic importance to the EU’s wider neighbourhood and the 
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selection of Mali was decided because it is the only country in the world to have two ongoing 
CSDP missions. Mali is a country with ongoing security challenges and the EU’s decision to 
reform and extend EUTM Mali and establish EUCAP Sahel Mali reaffirms the role of the EU as 
a global actor providing multidimensional initiatives to address the issues Mali and the Sahel 
region continues to face.   
The decision to contrast the two case studies was made because these two missions are both 
ongoing and in the same geographical location which means they have the exact same EU 
institutional structures in place as well as the political, economic and social conditions. These 
missions incorporate a mixture of multidimensional initiatives both civilian and military, short 
and long term. Because of this multidimensional approach in the region, EUTM Mali and 
EUCAP Sahel Mali are strong cases to determine whether the EUGS has had an influence on 
their mandates since it was released in 2016. 
EUTM Mali, as outlined in the introduction, started in February 2013. Initially planned for 
fifteen months, the mission has been extended until May 2020 and aims to provide expertise 
and advice to the Malian armed forces. This mission is in line with the EU Strategy for Security 
and Development in the Sahel with a mandate to “support and train the Malian Armed Forces 
and to help improve its military capacity” (EEAS, 2016a 19). Some of this support includes 
initiatives such as training on logistics management, human resources management, health 
service provision to the armed forces, security force organisation, international humanitarian 
law, and gender-based violence (EEAS, 2016a 19). EUTM, besides the security task of training 
soldiers, works towards creating a resilient Malian army that is less vulnerable to corruption 
and can effectively manage security crises through promoting peacebuilding, development 
and human rights.  
EUCAP Sahel Mali compliments EUTM and was established in April 2014 to assist in long term 
security and development in the Sahel. EUCAP Sahel Mali supports good governance and 
justice through a mandate to strengthen the internal security sector in Mali which will enable 
the peaceful and positive reform of the state. Some of the training modules provided by 
EUCAP Sahel Mali includes operational management, human resources management, 
professional ethics, border management, public order, intelligence techniques, professional 
intervention, disarmament, criminal policing, counter-terrorism and human rights and gender 
(EEAS, 2016a 18).  
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Both of these missions are of a peacebuilding character, as most CSDP missions are. They 
focus on a long-term solution for the security challenges in Mali. 
3.6 Research Limitations 
As is the case for every study, this thesis had some limitations. It needs to be noted that CSDP 
operations in the EU are just one factor related to the external initiatives of the EU. Among 
others, this area includes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), foreign trade issues, 
development policy and the representation of the EU in multilateral organisations like the 
United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Therefore, this thesis 
is limited to CSDP and the two missions ongoing in Mali. It will be recognised that France had 
a significant role in the establishment of the missions, however the involvement of other 
actors will not be the focus of this thesis as the range of actors in the region is extremely 
complex. France’s role will be highlighted in chapter 5, however it is to provide context in 
order to answer the research question. 
As this research focuses on just two case studies of CSDP there is a limitation that indicates 
that the research cannot provide an answer to whether the EUGS has had an influence on all 














CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS 
In Chapter 2, the literature review outlined key concepts of CSDP and the EU’s identity as a 
global actor highlighting the comprehensive approach to global issues and the challenges 
commonly faced by CSDP missions. This section will highlight the findings of content analysis 
of the 2016 EUGS and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports as described in Chapter 3.  
This thesis aims to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP Annual Reports 
to determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP operations. In 
order to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to understand if 
and how new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations. Therefore, this 
chapter will identify and quote core segments of the EUGS that specifically relate to the key 
words that are most frequently used within the EUGS. The table below (Table one) highlights 
the frequency of certain concepts or terms used throughout the EUGS in 2016 compared to 
the same concepts or phrases being used in the 2003 European Security Strategy. This was 
done using a key word search within content analysis of both documents to identify the most 
common terms and concepts within both documents.  
Table One: Table of frequent terms in 2016 EUGS and 2003 ESS13 
Concept/Term used European Global Strategy 
2016 
European Security Strategy 
2003 
Peace 60 6 
Security 150 33 
Development 68 12 
EU Values 26 3 
Global 141 22 
Action 57 6 
Disarmament 4 1 
Arms Control 5 1 
Multilateralism  18 6 
 
                                                          
13 Created by researcher. 
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Figure four, as shown below, is the word cloud generated by Wordle from the content of the 
EUGS. Wordle was used because it is one of the most popular word cloud generators as it 
creates a clean and well organised cloud that helps conduct a clear visual representation of 
words (Burch et al., 2013). The predominant reason for choosing Wordle is the promotion of 
the site from several well-known Non-Governmental Organisations who use the site on their 
own websites such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch. The benefit of 
using a word cloud in content analysis is that it gives a clear visual representation of the 
frequency certain terms or concepts have in any document.  
Figure Four: Wordle Word Cloud14  
 
As can be seen from both table one and figure four the frequency of the words peace, security, 
development, global, multilateralism and disarmament shows the emphasis of the concepts 
within the EUGS. For example, the word “peace” is significantly larger than other concepts 
and terms which demonstrates the importance of the word to the EU and its foreign policy 
especially given that the EU supports the UNs purpose of “upholding international peace and 
security”. A peaceful environment is a priority for EU external action because it results in less 
threats to European security within its own borders. The frequency of the term 
“disarmament” was surprising as it was lower than expected compared to other terms that 
were more frequent such as “security”. Disarmament was expected to have been a high 
                                                          
14 http://www.wordle.net/  
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priority for EU external action within the global strategy due to pressure from the UN and 
anti-nuclear NGOs from recent global meetings. It is clear from the word cloud that although 
“disarmament” is incorporated into the word cloud, it isn’t as high of a priority as some of the 
other terms, like “security”. “Security” in this context within the EUGS means preventing 
conflict erupting and ensuring that borders are secure through preventing trafficking through 
arms, humans or other such means. Given that the EUGS was the document being analysed 
for term frequency in this world cloud, it is not surprising that the largest sized term here is 
the “EU”. The “EU” in this context means the entire Union as well as foreign policy bodies 
such as the EEAS who are key to delivering many of the ambitions laid out in the EUGS. This 
word cloud is a visual representation of the frequency certain terms or concepts have in the 
2016 EUGS, this section will draw upon the top eight most frequently used concepts in the 
EUGS and provide evidence from the 2016-2017 Annual CSDP Reports and other relevant 
sources to conclude that there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions in 
Mali and the release of the EUGS, suggesting influence.  
4.1 Peace  
In Federica Mogherini’s foreword of the 2016 EUGS she emphasises the significance of 
building on 70 years of peace that the EU has been an integral part of upholding. The term 
“peace” was used in the Global Strategy 60 times and emphasised from the beginning with 
Mogherini’s foreword. The EUGS highlights the priorities of the EU within their external action 
through ensuring that the EU “will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, 
and foster human security through an integrated approach” (Union, 2016 9).  
The establishment of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014 has 
been the part of the EU’s new generation of instruments to foster conflict prevention, crisis 
response and peacebuilding externally (EEAS, 2016b). The IcSP currently manages over 200 
projects in over 75 countries in areas such as disarmament, arms control, mediation, 
reconstruction, rehabilitation and stabilization, with a budget of €2.3 billion for the period 
2014-2020. In Mali, the IcSP has funded four projects, with the final project’s duration ending 
on first of July 2018. These projects were complimentary to the two ongoing CSDP missions 
in Mali with the CSDP missions playing a crucial role in the IcSP projects implementation on 
the ground.   
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Although the IcSP isn’t specifically mentioned within the EUGS itself, the projects funded 
through the IcSP are part of the EU’s priorities outlined in the EUGS in relation to 
peacebuilding globally. The first project financed under IcSP was “Women Organising to Re-
establish Social and Community Cohesion” which had a duration until September 2016. This 
project resulted in 39 women’s organisations being engaged in peace and security initiatives 
in Mali, organisations which are still engaging in the peacebuilding process today. In addition 
to the creation of these organisations, 9 national workshops were conducted on the role of 
women in the peace process supplemented by 5 advocacy events to promote the role of 
women in the peace process. This project in particular was funded by the EU to promote the 
peace process and ensure that gender equality was a priority when doing so.  
The second projects name was “Relaunching the local economy and support collectivities in 
Northern Mali” which lasted until May 2017. It focused on building peace and stability 
through relaunching the local economy in Northern Mali. The project supported economic 
projects and focused on local communities who were affected by the Mali conflict. This 
project is especially relevant given that the two case study missions are located in Mali and 
this project complements the work of CSDP in peacebuilding and ensuring the local economy 
is supported to help facilitate the peace process in Mali. 
The third project had a duration of 2 years and was completed in May 2017. The project 
contributed to peace in Mali through facilitating reconciliation and dialogue between 
different sections of society. The project created a professional Malian media through training 
journalists throughout the country. This resulted in access to balanced, independent 
information which helped reduce the efforts of rumours and propaganda. The EU funded this 
project to promote their new generation of instruments to foster conflict prevention, crisis 
response and peacebuilding externally (EEAS, 2016b). The ongoing CSDP missions in Mali have 
played a crucial role in the IcSP projects implementation on the ground.   
The fourth project which was officially concluded on the first of July 2017 was a project that 
contributed to security sector reform in Mali. The project coordinated information and action 
by domestic security agencies under the authority of the Minister of Security and contributed 
to restoring trust between the security forces and Malian citizens. This project was funded 
through EUTM Mali and was a joint initiative between the EU and MINUSMA.  
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The EUGS highlights the importance of resilience and the ability for states and societies to 
reform post conflict (Ejdus and Juncos, 2018 5), the EU is showing their commitment to 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) and peacebuilding through IcSP projects as outlined above. The 
integrated approach of IcSP alongside the Mali CSDP operations shows the EU is engaging in 
a “practical and principled” (Union, 2016 9) way in Mali as noted in the EUGS. 
We will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security 
and prosperity. We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa 
(Union, 2016 36). 
Within the EUGS one of the bolded subtitles is “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, 
Middle East and Africa”. The EU has outlined their commitment to invest in African peace and 
development within the EUGS as shown with the quote above. By doing this the EU is 
systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in the Sahel as well as North and West Africa 
which directly impacts Mali, where this research is focused. In order to determine whether 
the EUGS has influenced CSDP mandates in Mali, evidence from the 2016-2017 CSDP Annual 
Reports was used to demonstrate the influence the EUGS has had. 
The major development since the release of the EUGS in 2016 was the announcement of a 
proposed new European Peace Facility (EPF) by High Representative Federica Mogherini on 
13 June 2018 which is not related to the current IcSP. The creation of the EPF would be used 
as an additional funding mechanism outside the current Multiannual Financial Framework 
(EEAS, 2018i). Mogerhini announced the EPF would be worth €10.5 billion over a seven-year 
period and would build on the African Peace Facility (APF) that currently exists to promote 
peace and security in Africa. It is intended that the EPF would continue to finance African-led 
peace support operations such as the G5 Sahel Force, while also contributing to common 







Figure five: European Peace Facility Factsheet15 
 
Figure five shows a graphic that highlights the intentions behind creating an EPF. The design 
would provide “more flexible financial assistance” (EEAS, 2018i) to EU partners in peace 
support operations. Figure 5 demonstrates the EPF as being an “off budget” initiative which 
would be used for military or defence projects. The purpose of creating such a facility is the 
fact that the EU wants to “enhance efforts” in Africa and this facility would allow them to 
work towards doing so. The establishment of the EPF also directly impacts the two ongoing 
CSDP missions in Mali as it will allow for more effective financing of the current missions. 
The APF, established in 2003, is not being replaced by the EPF and will continue to carry out 
its three core purposes: “funding African-led Peace Support Operations, supporting long-term 
development and capacity building of the institutions of the ASPA, and funding Early 
Response Mechanism (ERM), a tool to prevent crises and their escalation, through among 
others mediation efforts” (Dijkstra et al., 2017 16). The announcement of a new EPF by 
Mogherini symbolises the EU’s commitment to investing in African peace and development, 
an investment inspired by the 2016 EUGS. An EPF would enhance the capabilities of CSDP in 





Africa and would contribute to the continued implementation of mandates in Mali through 
complementing current initiatives undertaken by the APF. 
4.2 Security  
The EU aims to present itself as a global security provider through its contribution to CSDP 
missions and operations. Currently 2,600 civilian and 4,000 military staff from all 28 Member 
States are deployed around the world to uphold international peace and security (EEAS, 
2016a 2). In Mali, 571 personnel are on the ground from 29 countries in the EUTM mission 
and 105 personnel from 13 EU Member States in the EUCAP Sahel mission. The EUGS 
highlights the expectations of the EU by its partners to have a major role in the international 
community “including as a global security provider” (Union, 2016 3). 
The term “security” was repeated in the EUGS 150 times, it was the most common term used 
throughout the document. The EUGS not only incorporates internal security but international 
security, promoting shared interests with partners to uphold international security. 
We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security 
sector reform efforts enable and enhance our partners’ capabilities to deliver security 
within the rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, 
coordinating our work on capacity building with the UN and NATO in particular (Union, 
2016 26).  
In Mali, the EU has made significant progress towards the ambitions of the EUGS. In 2016, 
EUTM Mali supported the renewal of a training curriculum for police to create sustainable, 
standardised, high-quality training for both new recruits and seasoned officers. The EU 
enhanced their Malian partners capabilities through the new Train-the-Trainer initiative 
whereby Malians took ownership of the training processes learning how to conduct the 
training activities alongside Mission trainers (EEAS, 2016a 19).  In total, 1262 MaAF were 
trained in 2016, a significant increase to previous years. 
EUTM also incorporated advisory sessions on running armed forces for the Malian 
government to incorporate into their armed forces with sessions such as “logistics 
management, human resources management, health service provision to the armed forces, 
security, force organisation, international humanitarian law, and gender-based violence” 




In relation to security, the EU consistently highlights the need to become a “more responsive 
Union” (Union, 2016 46) which will developed through diplomacy, CSDP and development. 
The EUGS promotes the ambition of the EU to ensure that CSDP becomes more rapid and 
effective which aims to give the EU and its partners the ability to respond to crises rapidly and 
effectively.  
A responsive CSDP also requires streamlining our institutional structure. We must 
strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections 
between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may 
be deployed in the same theatre (Union, 2016 48). 
The missions in Mali have made significant progress in strengthening operational planning 
and conduct structures due to recent institutional developments such as the MPCC and EPF. 
The drafting of a new Field Security Handbook in 2016 has resulted in the redefining of 
guidelines in the organisation and management of all CSDP missions. This handbook outlines 
and highlights the EUGS as giving a “new momentum to the development of the CSDP” (Rehrl 
and Weisserth, 2017 18). Implementation of security and defensive measures have been a 
priority within the EUGS and developments in this area can be seen through the two ongoing 
missions in Mali. In 2017, the EEAS handled “1400 calls to their hotline to reduce tensions and 
conducted 100 interviews conducting local actors on the future shape of CSDP work in the 
Sahel” (EEAS, 2017a 7).  
In addition to this, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) unit in Brussels drafted 
operational guidelines on “gender mainstreaming, police-prosecutor cooperation and anti-
corruption practices” (EEAS, 2017a 9) to ensure efficiency in CSDP missions mandates. This 
directly had a positive impact in Mali as these guidelines were incorporated into the 2017 
training modules within EUTM Mali. 
The most recent institutional development within the EU was the establishment of the 
Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff. Mogherini said 
“the establishment of the MPCC is a very important operational decision to strengthen 
European defence. It will contribute to make the non-executive European missions more 
effective and to improve the training of soldiers of partner countries, to guarantee peace and 
security. This is important not just for our partners, but also for the European Union's 
security" (EEAS, 2018h). This institutional development includes EUTM Mali and has been a 
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positive development that has provided better support to the mission from Brussels. The 
MPCC has been working closely with the existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC), sharing knowledge and expertise on best practices to address 
issues relating both to civilian and military missions. These two units work alongside one 
another in Mali and have provided the two ongoing missions with enhanced support and 
management from Brussels.  
The EU have taken important steps to promote unity of the Union in the past such as the 
Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice-President of the 
European Commission and the EEAS. “A Joined-up Union” was consistently emphasised 
throughout the EUGS to encourage coherence, cooperation and dialogue between all EU 
Member States in order to have the best possible outcome in addressing international 
security issues. This emphasis in the EUGS also incorporated the importance of cooperating 
as a Union on defence.  
Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as a norm. The 
voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. A 
sustainable, innovation and competitive European defence industry is essential for 
Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP (Union, 2016 45). 
The EU has introduced two key developments to show its commitment to implementing the 
priorities of the EUGS. The first development was the launch of a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) on defence in December 2017 where 25 Member States adopted the 
decision to establish PESCO in the area of security and defence policy. PESCO was introduced 
in the Lisbon Treaty however Member States did not unanimously decide to implement all 
appropriate actions to launch PESCO in 2011; 2017 marked the official launching of PESCO. 
The renewed interest in Member States working more closely in security and defence will 
allow the development of joint defence capabilities, investment into shared projects and it 
will ultimately enhance the operational readiness and contribution of armed forces (EU, 
2017a). This development, as highlighted in the 2017 CSDP Annual Report, marks a “historic 
move to facilitate cooperation” (EEAS, 2017a 5) between Member States of the EU and it will 
fill some crucial gaps in the capabilities of the EU in security and defence policy. 
The other key development inspired by the ambitions of the EUGS was the launching up of a 
European Defence Fund in June 2017. The 2016 European Defence Action Plan outlined how 
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a European Defence Fund and other actions can strengthen Member States cooperation and 
capabilities on security and defence (Commission, 2017b). As shown in figure six, the 
European Defence Fund is an ambitious initiative that will result in more efficient spending 
on security and defence with current research projects being conducted on the areas of 
drones, strategic technology foresight and soldier protection and equipment (Commission, 
2017b). The bolded words within figure six show the importance of certain words and phrases 
to the EU. For example, the European Defence Fund is highlighted in figure six as being 
valuable as it will “help Member States to spend taxpayer’s money more efficiently and get 
better value for their investment” (Figure six). By bolding this particular sentence, the EU is 
attempting to highlight the fact that this new fund will result in more efficient spending of EU 
funds which will in turn assist CSDP mission’s capacity to fulfil their mandates. 







There are 5 current research projects within the European Defence Fund. The expected 
budget post 2020 for this fund is €5.5 billion per year for projects on both research and 
development. Although this fund does not specifically support the CSDP missions in Mali at 
this stage, it is expected that the benefits of the fund will filter through the overarching CSDP 









Development was mentioned 68 times in the EUGS. The EEAS have consistently attempted to 
embed development policies into their security policies as they are aware of the link between 
security and development. The EUGS highlights this link specifically; 
We must become more joined up in our security and development policies. CSDP 
capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law 
work by the Commission. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition 
from short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along 
the conflict cycle. Long term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights 
must be tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and 
diplomacy (Union, 2016 50-51). 
In 2016, the EU adopted new measures to enhance security and development cooperation. 
The EU Emergency Trust Fund for the Sahel and the Counter Terrorism Sahel project both 
contribute to enhancing security and development in the Sahel region and their projects have 
assisted EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali with their financial assistance of €280 million 
towards reducing migration in Northern Mali (Maibaum, 2016 44). In addition to this, the 
2016-2020 Sahel Action Plan was the first comprehensive approach including development 
and security cooperation released by the EU to tackle transnational challenges in the wider 
European Neighbourhood (Maibaum, 2016 42). This Action Plan involves both EUTM Mali and 
EUCAP Sahel to help contribute to achieving the target points. These target points are as 
follows; 
1. “prevention and countering radicalisation; 
2. creation of appropriate conditions for youth; 
3. migration and mobility 
4. border management, the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised 
crime” (Maibaum, 2016 197). 
The emphasis of ownership and cooperation between all internal and external actors was 
specifically highlighted in the plan. EUTM Mali’s mandate is contributing to the target point 
of border management whereas EUCAP Sahel Mali is focusing on target points 1-3.  
CSDP in Mali is also contributing to long term pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights. 
In the 2017 Annual CSDP Report, Mogerhini reported that the EU increased efforts to raise 
the level of gender and human rights integration across all missions. She highlighted that “all 
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missions now have a provision for a Gender or Gender and Human Rights Advisor, and six 
Missions have a fully established gender focal point system” (EEAS, 2017a 30).  
The Sahel Strategy is the overarching EU strategy that incorporates the development-security 
nexus. The three key objectives of the Sahel Strategy are carefully aligned with the CSDP 
mission mandates in the Sahel; 
1) “Reducing insecurity  
2) Improving development 
3) Strengthening governance and stability” (Koenig, 2014 238). 
Despite the Sahel Strategy being introduced in 2011, it is still very relevant to the ongoing 
missions in Mali. The release of the EUGS has resparked the conversation within the EU of 
combining security and development initiatives. This conversation is centred around the 
Cotonou Agreement as this is the partnership that development cooperation has been based 
upon since 2000. With the Cotonou Agreement ending in 2020 it is necessary for the EU to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of this partnership in order to strengthen the 
agreement post 2020. The current Cotonou Agreement emphasises a more social direction 
for EU development policy and acknowledges the importance of regional approaches. In line 
with Cotonou, the EU in 2017 established a civilian-military Regional Coordination Cell (RCC) 
based within EUCAP Sahel Mali. The RCC establishment has resulted in the organisation of 
training courses through current ongoing CSDP missions in the Sahel supporting the G5 Sahel 
countries work together to eradicate threats to the regions peace and security (EU, 2017b). 
The Council Conclusions in June 2017 recall the EU’s strong “integrated approach towards 
achieving stabilisation in the region, including a full range of relevant instruments in the field 
of diplomacy, long-term development cooperation, support to human rights, stabilisation 
efforts, resilience building, humanitarian assistance, migration management and security, 
including CSDP missions” (EU, 2017b). The EUGS has motivated the EU to fulfil its promises in 
incorporating security and development initiatives in the region however it will be essential 
to Sahel peace and security that these initiatives are embedded within the post-2020 






The EU continues to promote the UN as the core of global order throughout the EUGS. 
Investing in the UN is seen as crucial to ensuring global norms and values are upheld and the 
EU has continued to invest in UN peacekeeping as well as their own CSDP missions to 
complement ongoing UN missions. The EU highlights in the EUGS that they want to commit 
to transforming “Global Governance for the 21st Century” (Union, 2016 39) rather than 
preserving the existing system to increase multilateral cooperation and investment into 
eradicating global issues. 
The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, 
and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional 
organisations, states and non-state actors (Union, 2016 10). 
Both EU CSDP missions in Mali coordinate and cooperate with the ongoing UN Mission 
MINUSMA. MINUSMA has conducted and coordinated 61 training courses with EUTM Mali, 
heavily relying on EUCAP and EUTM Mali’s training quality and content (Dijkstra et al., 2017 
28). Both the UN and EU have developed globally coordinated responses since the EUGS was 
released in 2016, the most recent being the advisory panel on 4 policies in Mali including the 
National Border Policy and its Action Plan (EEAS, 2017a 20). The EU and UN also cooperated 
in assisting Malian authorities to draft a National Strategy on Border Security alongside the 
International Organisation for Migration. Not only is the EU cooperating and coordinating 
with the UN in Mali, they have stated their ambition in the EUGS to have a multidimensional, 
multiphased, multi-level and multilateral approach to external crises; 
A multidimensional approach through using all available policies and instruments 
aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential…A multiphased 
approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, 
resolution and stabilisation, and avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis 
erupts elsewhere…A multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, 
regional and global levels…A multilateral approach engaging all those players present 
in a conflict and necessary for its resolution (Union, 2016 28-29). 
Since the release of the EUGS in 2016, the EU CSDP missions in Mali have enhanced 
cooperation with relevant actors and invested into upholding peace and security in Mali long-
term. In 2017, the EU invested into the prevention, resolution and stabilisation of challenges 
facing Mali by working with 128 staff (local and international) on “human resource 
management, the fight against terrorism and organised crime, and border management” 
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(EEAS, 2017a 20) through training initiatives within EUTM Mali and offering local partners the 
opportunity to gain strategic legal advice on how to enhance capacity building in Mali. In 
addition, 56 trainings were held on “forensics, counter-terrorism, human rights, operational 
management and human resources for 1674 people” (EEAS, 2017a 20). These trainings 
incorporated a multi-level approach acting at the local, national and international level 
through involving local and international partners. EUCAP Sahel Mali led three introductory 
legal drafting capacity building workshops for 19 legislative drafters from the National 
Assembly, the Secretariat General of the Government and several ministers in an attempt to 
engage relevant actors who will promote sustainable peace and security in Mali. Both CSDP 
missions in Mali also incorporated the multilateral approach to conflict throughout 2017 by 
enhancing civil-military cooperation and joint activities between EUTM Mali and UN 
MINUSMA. This joint cooperation also included the establishment of a Joint Task Force to 
support the implementation of the Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions in Mali. 
This task force conducted several missions in 2017 to remote Segou and Mopti regions 
working with the Governor, Malian security forces, civil society and MINUSMA (EEAS, 2017a 
20). The EUGS encouraged supporting joint cooperation between the EU and its partners as 
well as specifically highlighting the need for stronger links with its African partners which 
would have a direct impact on CSDP missions in Mali; 
The EU will support cooperation across sub-regions…systematically addressing cross-
border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through 
closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western Africa States 
(ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel (Union, 2016 35). 
As previously mentioned, the EU established a Regional Coordination Cell in 2017 which 
signalled the EU’s commitment to support the G5 Sahel countries in their effort to reform the 
security sector. The EU also attended a meeting between the African Union, African Regional 
Organisations and the UN in July 2017 which discussed initiatives to strengthen peace and 
security on the African continent. This high level meetings discussions were in the lead up to 
the 5th AU-EU Summit as well as against the “backdrop of Africa’s determination to silence 
guns on the continent by the year 2020” (EEAS, 2017b). Enhancing political dialogue between 
the EU and the AU has been a priority for EU foreign policy and these meetings and Summits 
highlight the importance of this not only to the EU but to the AU and international community.  
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The EU has long been collectively the biggest donor to the UN budget (30.38% in 2017 budget) 
and the biggest donor to UN peacekeeping operations (31.98% in 2017) (Dijkstra et al., 2017 
12). Moreover, the EU’s level of voluntary contributions to UN funds and programmes amount 
to roughly half of all voluntary contributions, investing in peacebuilding, development, 
humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention. The EUGS prioritises believing in the UN as 
part of its multilateral cooperation. As quoted within the EUGS “believing in the UN means 
investing in it, notably in its peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian 
functions” (Union, 2016 40). 
The EU has not only invested financially in the UN but since the release of the EUGS in 2016 
it has moved to adopt more frequent strategic partnership documents. There are twice-yearly 
meetings between the EU and UN regarding the current partnership in Crisis Management 
and Peacekeeping where the EU and UN have committed to cooperating more frequently on 
the ground in peacekeeping operations to have the biggest possible impact wherever they 
are deployed. The EU has shown this commitment with its cooperation in Mali between 
MINUSMA and EUTM Mali.  
4.4 EU Values 
As highlighted in the literature review in Chapter 2, the EU shares global values which 
incorporates norms such as “peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights and gender equality” (Manners, 2002). These values alongside development and 
security policies shape EU action externally which is reflected in the EUGS. The EUGS 
specifically highlights gender equality and promoting the EU’s internal gender balance as 
being crucial for strengthening external action; 
Promoting the role of women in peace efforts – from implementing UNSC Resolution 
on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU’s internal gender balance. It 
entails having more systematic resource to cultural, inter-faith, scientific and 
economic diplomacy in conflict settings (Union, 2016 31). 
As previously mentioned, in 2017, the EU incorporated a Gender or Gender and Human Rights 
Advisor provision for all CSDP missions, with six current missions having a fully established 
and functioning gender focal point system (EEAS, 2017a 30). In addition to improving the EU’s 
internal gender balance, within EUCAP Sahel Mali the first female intervention trainer 
graduated in Mali. Marshal Awa Kante said she hopes her “female colleagues will join this 
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effort to reach gender equality” in the 2017 Annual CSDP Report (EEAS, 2017a 20). Gender 
mainstreaming was approved in 2017 by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability unit 
which provides guidelines to all CSDP missions. Bert Versmessen, acting Commander of the 
current ten civilian CSDP missions in Europe, Africa and the Middle East has highlighted that 
the EU knows that “integrating the gender perspective makes crisis-management and 
peacebuilding more efficient” (EEAS, 2018c). The development of the guidelines to promote 
this has strengthened CSDP significantly.  
4.5 EU Action 
EU Action was mentioned 57 times as shown in Table one. Action refers to anything in the 
EUGS that is requiring the EU to implement something new on the ground or to improve what 
is already being done. When the term “action” was used within the EUGS, it predominantly 
linked itself to what the EU’s ambitions are to make certain changes within their current 
external action. For example; 
The EU will act at all stages of the conflict, acting promptly on prevention, responding 
responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature 
disengagement when a new crises erupts (Union, 2016 9-10). 
This particular quote from the EUGS is committing the EU to ensure it is taking action at all 
stages of conflict which has not always been consistent within CSDP. However, since the 
release of the EUGS the extended mandate of EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali has shown 
the EU’s commitment to long-term stability in the region. EUTM Mali currently has 581 staff 
and has invested in stabilisation through educating the Malian Armed Forces and offering 
training and advice to build the capacity in security capabilities within the Armed Forces. The 
EU has done this most significantly in 2017 through organising training courses for 2295 
Malian Armed Forces personnel. The training included subjects on leadership, medical 
training, small and support arms courses, disarmament, arms control, engineering and 
logistics (EEAS, 2017a 21). The release of the EUGS has encouraged the EU to continue these 
trainings and develop new modules that will assist the Malian Armed Forces in future conflict 
prevention and management. 
Another example of the EU committing to action on the ground within the EUGS was the 
ambition to “redouble efforts on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights 
violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change“ (Union, 2016 29). Following the 
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release of the EUGS in 2016, the EU added a human rights and gender training module into 
EUTM Mali. The “train-the-trainer” module existed before 2016 but the addition of the 
human rights and gender application into the module created a multiplier effect and 
promoted the role of human rights and gender within all trainings EUTM conducted from 
2016 onwards. In 2018, the EU went further to promote human rights and gender equality 
through supporting an event in Mali with aimed at improving the understanding of the 
missions of the National Human Rights Commission. 120 persons took part in the event, 
intended for security and defence forces in Mali, and it was organised and financed by the 
Human Rights and Gender Unit of EUCAP Sahel Mali (EEAS, 2018d). This event that took place 
in March 2018 helped develop a culture of human rights in Mali and encourage partnership 
between civil society and government to promote and uphold human rights and gender 
equality. 
4.6 Global 
The term “global” was one of the most frequently used terms within the EUGS which is not 
surprising given that its intention is to be a Global Strategy looking forward for EU external 
action. “Global” became relevant for this thesis especially when the EUGS emphasised Africa 
and their intentions to enhance cooperation and partnerships with African organisations as 
this thesis focuses on the two CSDP missions in Mali.  The EUGS incorporates “global” into 
many sections of the document however it emphasises the importance of investing in African 
peace and development as an investment into European security and prosperity (Union, 2016 
36) which links to sustainable global development. The EUGS also lays out how the EU will 
invest into African peace and development; 
We will build stronger links between trade, development and security policies in 
Africa…we will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist 
African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism, migration and 
border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as 
well as trust funds to back up regional strategies (Union, 2016 36).  
The African Peace Facility has been the EU’s main tool to support peace and security efforts 
in Africa. The APF was established in 2003 based on the recognition that peace is a necessary 
precondition for sustainable development (Commission, 2017a 6). Since 2004, the APF has 
supported 14 African-led Peace Support Operations. In 2017, the most active operations were 
in the Sahel allocating funding to a combination of immediate short-term funding in the event 
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of crises and longer-term support for institutional capacity building in African peace and 
security such is the case in Mali. The peak of funding reached an all-time high in 2017 with 
€385 million being allocated to the APF (Commission, 2017a 6). In their effort to continue 
supporting peace and security efforts in Africa, as laid out by the EUGS, the EU adopted a 
decision in April 2017 on the 2017-2018 Action Programme of the APF. The goal of the action 
plan was to “contribute to promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development” (Commission, 2017a 6) directly aligning with UN Sustainable Development 
Goal 16 (on peace, justice and strong institutions) and with the African Union’s Agenda 2063 
commitment “to silence the guns by 2020” which would result in the reduction of the number 
of violent conflicts on the continent.  
As can be seen in figure seven, the African-led Peace Operations in Mali have been run by the 
newly established G5 Sahel Force. The EU welcomed the establishment of this force as it was 
seen as “a clear demonstration of the G5 Sahel countries’ willingness to tackle the 
deteriorating security environment in the region and to cooperate against transnational 
threats in a coordinated and structured manner” (Commission, 2017a 18). 











                                                          
17 African Peace Facility Annual Report 2017 (page 19). 
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Given that the Cotonou Agreement, between the 79 ACP countries and the EU, provides the 
legal framework for the APF, the EUGS outlines the area of peace and security to remain high 
on the agenda with the proposal of a new Cotonou Partnership Agreement post 2020.  
4.7 Disarmament/ Arms Control 
Despite disarmament only being mentioned 4 times in the EUGS, it is still relevant to this 
thesis as one of the sub-questions to the research question is determining whether the EU 
has contributed to arms control in Mali through the two ongoing CSDP missions, EUTM Mali 
and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Disarmament and arms control is a universal term that is promoted 
through the UN and relevant NGOs, the EU has supported the conversation on disarmament 
and arms control through incorporating it into the EUGS;  
The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full 
implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and 
arms control treaties and regimes (Union, 2016 41).  
In 2017, EUCAP Sahel Mali put a stronger emphasis on disarmament through mentoring 
senior officials on Security Sector Reform. The mentoring was not only on SSR but also 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (EEAS, 2017a 7). The EU has recognised illicit 
weapons as a contributor to terrorism and organised crime within the EU and in the EU’s 
wider neighbourhood. To address this issue, Federica Mogherini and the European 
Commission adopted a joint proposal for a comprehensive EU strategy against illicit firearms, 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) in June 2018 (EEAS, 2018a). The Joint Communication 
signals a step forward to addressing the issue of arms control and disarmament and puts 
forward objectives and actions against illicit firearms, small weapons, light weapons and their 
ammunition. Mogherini has said that this EU Strategy will be “closely connected with United 
Nations Programme of Action against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” 
discussed in late June 2018 (EEAS, 2018a).  
To conclude, from the findings of content analysis of the EUGS and 2016-2017 Annual CSDP 
Reports there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions in Mali and the 
release of the EUGS, suggesting influence. The core segments from the EUGS that were 
highlighted throughout this chapter demonstrate the significance of the most frequent terms 
and concepts that were found in the EUGS which were peace, security, development, EU 
Values, global, action, disarmament, arms control and multilateralism. These specific terms 
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and concepts were shown both visually, in a word cloud by Wordle, and through highlighting 
core segments of the EUGS followed by evidence that suggests the EUGS has influenced the 
two ongoing missions in Mali. CSDP is an important tool used by the EU to promote peace, 
development and sustainable security in the regions they are active in. The EUGS is an 
ambitious document that promotes the EU as a global security provider, peacebuilder and 
partner for many other countries and organisations. As outlined in Chapter 3 with the 
methodologies used for this thesis, Krippendorff is a key scholar who outlines how to conduct 
successful content analysis. When conducting content analysis the findings in this chapter 
were a direct result of following Krippendorff’s four key points on how to successfully apply 
content analysis as a method in research; 
1. “Sample text, in the sense of selecting what is relevant; 
2. Unitize text, in the sense of distinguishing words or propositions and using quotes and 
examples; 
3. Contextualize what is being read in light of what is known about the circumstances 
surrounding the text; 
4. Have specific research questions in mind” (Krippendorff, 2004 87). 
The following chapter will discuss the findings of content analysis in the context of the chosen 
theory for this thesis and will answer the sub-questions of the research question. The next 
chapter will also discuss some of the core issues that were uncovered in the analysis of CSDP 
in Mali which specifically relates to the role of France, militarisation of the EU and the future 
of the EU as a global actor. The chapter concludes with recommendations to enhance EU 




CHAPTER 5 - DISCUSSION 
The international community has increasingly seen peace and security as priority issues, 
especially the European Union. Over 450 million European citizens continue to question what 
the EU is doing to ensure they can go on enjoying decades of peace, freedom, stability and 
security as these are no longer a given in an increasingly interdependent world. The release 
of the EUGS in 2016 has given the EU a strong guide for continued external action and has 
already achieved more in the last 2 years in the field of peacebuilding, security and defence 
than in the decade before (Staff, 2017 3). The case studies of the two ongoing CSDP missions 
in Mali not only exposes the EU’s determination of establishing itself as a comprehensive, 
global security actor but also may reveal the actual achievements and shortcomings of 
implementing the ambitions of EUGS into current CSDP missions. 
This chapter will discuss the influence the EUGS has had on the two ongoing missions in Mali 
through the findings of content analysis from the previous chapter. This discussion will centre 
around the theoretical conceptualization of Chris Hills Capabilities-Expectations Gap and 
whether this has been a relevant factor in the mandates of CSDP, France’s role in the 
achievements of implementing the EUGS in Mali, the impact of militarisation of the EU and 
the EU’s future as a global security actor. This chapter will also answer the two sub questions 
of the research question; 
1. Has the EU accounted for the security-development nexus in Mali? 
2. Has the EU contributed to arms control in the region? 
Finally, this chapter will discuss the possibilities of increased multilateral cooperation before 
discussing recommendations to enhance peacekeeping capabilities in the future.  
5.1 Linking Theory and Evidence: The Capabilities-Expectations Gap in Mali 
This thesis argues that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap introduced by Chris Hill still has great 
explanatory power despite being introduced in 1993. The EU has been criticized for not 
delivering consistently given the state of its economic system and the resources at its disposal 
politically and institutionally. Hill’s original argument highlighted three core components of 
the Capabilities-Expectations Gap as being the EU’s ability to agree, its resource availability 
and the instruments at its disposal. This thesis argues that the EU has developed since 1993 
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and Hill’s 1993 Capabilities-Expectations Gap has narrowed significantly due to recent 
institutional developments and policy changes. The release of the EUGS in 2016 has played a 
particular role in the narrowing of this gap as can be seen in Chapter 4. This thesis followed 
Karen. E Smith’s view of looking at what the EU actually does, and these actions outlined in 
Chapter 4 naturally led back to Hill’s Capabilities-Expectations Gap.  
5.12 Resource availability 
The EU is typically seen as a wealthy international actor (Dijkstra et al., 2017 39). The 
resources of the EU in the case of Mali is predominantly financial towards the ongoing CSDP 
missions and projects in the Sahel region under various EU funding initiatives. One issue that 
CSDP missions have experienced in the past with resource availability is the constraint of 
inter-pillar competition for funds as well as national budgetary pressures from Member 
States. Declining defence expenditures has led to declining capabilities within CSDP but has 
also ignited the idea of pooling and sharing. The current financing mechanisms for CSDP has 
shown significant differences between funding civilian missions and military operations which 
has demonstrated that Member States have to commit higher individual contributions for the 
latter to be launched. This can be seen in Mali with EUTM’s budget being significantly larger 
than the civilian mission, EUCAP Sahel Mali. Given that CSDP is a voluntary policy, relying on 
the political will of Member States, missions are often led by a coalition of only a few willing 
states with other Member States simply free-riding (Hühnerfuß, 2016 20). This issue has not 
been prevalent in Mali due to the national interests of a large amount of Member States to 
contribute to both missions. However, it is an issue that has the potential to affect the EU’s 
capabilities in the future. If Member States are not willing to voluntarily contribute to CSDP 
missions, the EU will not be able to live up to its ambitious aim of being a leading global 
security provider. 
5.13 Ability to Agree 
The CSDP decision-making process has been regarded as reflecting a “high degree of 
legitimacy” (Hühnerfuß, 2016 20), but the mechanism that requires all Member States to 
agree unanimously before a mission can be launched has severely damaged the EU’s ability 
to respond in a rapid and flexible manner in external crises.  Additionally, the issue of decision-
makers being constrained by domestically embedded norms has had an impact on the action 
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undertaken in Mali. Implementation of the comprehensive approach has been a challenge for 
EU decision-makers because, unless a direct threat to European security has been perceived 
and a key Member State (or States) has taken the lead in mobilising the rest of the EU to 
agree, the comprehensive approach has fallen short of expectations (Furness and Olsen, 2016 
106). In Mali, the EU failed to agree and respond efficiently to the crises which led to France’s 
unilateral intervention with Operation Serval in 2013. Since France’s influence and 
mobilisation of EU Member States, the ability to agree within the decision-making process for 
action in Mali has significantly increased.  
5.14 Instruments at the EU’s Disposal 
Since Hill conceptualized the Capabilities-Expectations Gap in 1993, the instruments at the 
EU’s disposal has developed the most. For example, the launch of the new European Peace 
Facility, European Defence Fund, Military Planning Conduct Capability Unit, Regional 
Coordination Cell and PESCO have all been developed since the release of the EUGS in 2016. 
The release of the EUGS in 2016 played a significant role in the development of the above 
instruments to deliver EU capabilities within CSDP.  
Therefore, this thesis agrees with Toje (2008) in his argument that the EU possesses the 
necessary capabilities and institutions, but still “finds itself unable to deliver the foreign 
policies expected owing to a lack of decision-making procedures capable of overcoming 
dissent” ( 122). Toje refers to this as a Consensus-Expectations Gap rather than Hills 
conceptualization of a Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The Consensus-Expectations Gap is a 
gap between what the Member States are expected to agree on and what they are actually 
able to consent to. If this gap is to be narrowed, European foreign policy and external action 
must be grounded in demonstrated behaviour rather than potential and aspirations. The 2016 
EUGS has motivated the EU to act and engage in effective crisis management, demonstrating 
their ability to shape world affairs rather than making statements and setting examples in 
press releases and policy documents. 
5.2 France in Mali: The Crucial Actor 
When researching Mali, one simply cannot look past France’s strategic and post-colonial 
interests in West Africa which has had a significant influence in shaping EU action in the 
region. One of the most striking features of the EU’s response in Mali was the strong influence 
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exerted by France (Oluwadare, 2014 116). Mali is an example of one Member State being 
successful in turning national preferences and policy models into an EU common policy.  
France unilaterally intervened in Mali on two occasions with Operation Serval and Barkhane. 
The decision to unilaterally intervene has certainly impacted the EU’s credibility in responding 
quickly and effectively to external crises and has opened up criticism that the EU is incapable 
or unwilling (or both) to provide rapid military relief in a region that has been regarded to be 
of high strategic importance to the EU (Hühnerfuß, 2016 63). When conducting its own 
missions France did not make any reference to the EU; 
The terrorists should know that France will always be there, not when its fundamental 
interests are involved, but when the rights of a population – the Malian people who 
want to live in a free and democratic country – are concerned (Republic, 11 January 
2013). 
France’s strong diplomatic presence has been instrumental in ensuring deployment of both 
UN peacekeeping missions and EU civilian and military missions. France was very successful 
in multilateralising European efforts in Mali, especially with the deployment of EUTM Mali in 
2013. The French were first to deploy troops to EUTM Mali before CSDP experts entered the 
country. The amount of French personnel in both CSDP missions in Mali highlights their 
significant interest in the region; France provides 207 personnel to EUTM Mali with a total of 
465 EU personnel and 13 personnel to EUCAP Sahel Mali which has a total of 31 EU personnel 
being contributed.  
None of the current missions in Mali are militarized, MINUSMA, EUTM and EUCAP missions 
do not have the capabilities to oppose rebel groups. France is the only country with a military 
force on the ground capable of opposing rebel groups, because of this some representatives 
in civil society see the crisis in Northern Mali as a French intervention, not an EU or UN 
initiative (Moussa Djiré, 2017 33).  France remains one of the most important actors in the 
region because of their influence and capabilities on the ground. 
Overall, while the EU continues to demonstrate their global actorness through CSDP missions, 
the role of France has contributed to the successes achieved within EUTM Mali and EUCAP 
Sahel Mali. France, as a former colonial power in the region, has been instrumental in both 
EU and UN missions which shows how the mobilisation of the EU by one Member State can 
affect the political will of the entire EU. 
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5.3 Militarisation of the EU 
Since 2003, the EU has developed its military capabilities and now has a sizeable expeditionary 
force. Despite this, there is still criticism of the EU that the defence dimension of CSDP is 
largely underdeveloped. Since the release of the EUGS in 2016, and the launching of PESCO 
in addition to creating the European Defence Fund and Military Planning and Conduct 
Capability unit, the EU has shown a renewed interest in ensuring defence is incorporated into 
CSDP missions.  
Budget pressures have forced EU Member States to rethink their approaches to pooling and 
sharing resources to collaborate on defence matters (Giegerich, 2010 97). The case of Mali 
has been a strong example whereby Member States have realised economic and military logic 
has been calling for more collaboration. The multinational nature of deployments has also 
had a role in the shift towards increased defence cooperation among Member States. 
However, the concerns about the loss of national autonomy is still an issue standing in the 
way of further cooperation and collaboration in the defence field.  
The EU battlegroups have never been launched for arguably the same reasons why military 
operations are often more problematic to launch. If an EU battlegroup was to be launched, 
Member States would be required to cover the financial costs of the forces they contribute 
to the mission in addition to the mission needing a unanimous vote from all participating 
Member States. As is the case in Mali, Member States who bear the higher costs will only 
agree to the mission if their interests are at stake (Hühnerfuß, 2016 15). This is where the 
Consensus-Expectations Gap could become problematic in future CSDP missions. Mali has 
been a positive case of where the EU has not suffered from a Consensus-Expectations Gap 
due to pressure from France and the importance of the Sahel region to European and 
international security.  
This thesis will not draw any conclusions to the impact of militarisation on the EU however 
monitoring the impact of this would be an interesting new field of study for scholars. The 
EUGS has had a role in the renewed interest of defence for the EU but it is still too soon to 




5.4 The EU’s Future as a Global Actor 
The EU’s ambition to become a “global security actor” (Hühnerfuß, 2016 65) has been met by 
the multidimensional approach of the EU to make use of its versatile toolbox in crisis 
management missions beyond European borders. In the case of Mali, where this thesis is 
focused, addressing the conflict has meant combining military assistance with development 
aid, state-building efforts, training and capacity building of Malian authorities, peacebuilding, 
arms control, and security sector reforms. The EU launched the two ongoing missions in Mali 
to apply a truly comprehensive approach and has proven its capabilities with action on the 
ground.  
The release of the EUGS in 2016 reflects a renewed aim to strengthen and adapt to the 
changing political and economic global environment. Much of the EU’s actorness on the global 
stage stems from its normative role as a significant diplomatic actor which is reflected within 
the EUGS (Cross, 2016 404). The EUGS has developed a greater potential for the EU to 
continue its role as a global actor, however the Consensus-Expectations Gap continues to 
prohibit the EU from successfully implementing common EU policies. The decision-making 
rules and sovereignty issues within the EU continues to affect the role of the EU as a global 
actor, until the Consensus-Expectations Gap is narrowed from actions on the ground, the EU 
will continue to face significant challenges in being able to promote itself as a successful and 
effective global actor. 
The contested nature of the EU’s actorness is likely to continue (Kyris and Maltby, 2011 4), 
and the instruments at the EU’s disposal as well as its resource availability is set to continue 
to evolve. The timeliness of the release of the EUGS, in light of the Brexit referendum, shows 
the strategy itself as an exercise in diplomacy in its own right, an assurance to international 
partners and the international community as a whole, the commitment the EU will continue 
to make to uphold international peace and security. The EU remains at the forefront of global 
action and multilateral cooperation, the continued action in Mali and the developments since 
the release of the EUGS have placed the EU in a strong position to continue promoting its role 





5.5 Sub question 1: Has the EU accounted for the Security-Development Nexus in Mali? 
The Security-Development Nexus is especially important given that there “is a clear link 
between the security situation of a country on the one hand and the implementation and 
progress of sustainable development on the other hand” (Tardy, 2015b 1) according to several 
well-known scholars in the field. The recognition of this link has been at the heart of EU CSDP 
missions, especially in the Sahel region where this research is focused.  The EU began 
incorporating security and development measures simultaneously in 2011 with the release of 
the 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. This strategy influenced the 
2011 Agenda for Change whereby Mali was a key recipient of security-development 
initiatives. The Security and Development Strategy in the Sahel has been the key overarching 
strategy that incorporates and accounts for the security-development nexus. The first theme 
of this strategy is that “security and development in the Sahel cannot be separated, and that 
helping these countries achieve security is integral to enabling their economies to grow and 
poverty to be reduced” (EEAS, 2011).  
The 2015-2020 Sahel Region Action Plan has been the driver of implementation for the 
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. The Action Plan has shown the EU’s 
commitment of engagement in the Sahel region, particularly Mali with the two ongoing CSDP 
missions, and its support to sustainable and inclusive political and socio-economic 
development, the strengthening of human rights, democratic governance and the rule of law 
as well as resilience (EEAS, 2015a).  
Mali has been a key recipient of initiatives accounting for the security-development nexus 
through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Counter Terrorism Sahel fund18. The 
EUGS has led to continued commitment in incorporating the security-development nexus in 
Mali through the two ongoing CSDP missions and the Cotonou Agreement which is set to 
expire in 2020. It will be essential for Mali’s stability and security that the post-2020 
development partnership between the EU and ACP countries incorporates this nexus at the 
heart of the agreement.  
 
                                                          
18 EU has contributed €280 million towards security and development initiatives in Mali. 
62 
 
5.6 Sub question 2: Has CSDP in Mali contributed to arms control? 
The issue of arms in Mali has been ongoing and an issue the EU has specifically focused on 
within EUTM Mali’s mandate. CSDP in Mali has contributed to arms control in Mali but 
predominantly through the multilateral approach and working with partners such as the 
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and the United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.  
It takes an international effort to reduce the availability of small arms and light weapons, the 
EU is working towards a durable solution with the UN to promote arms control in Mali 
because of the weapons devastating effects on people’s livelihoods and on communities 
abilities to build peace and develop sustainably (Mugumya, 2016). The EU and UN have 
favoured a weapon collection programme in Mali as a means of addressing the cross-border 
transnational security challenges the region faces. From 2014-2016, the UNREC, alongside the 
EU, conducted a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration exercise in Mali whereby 
many small arms and light weapons were confiscated, but more remain at large. One of the 
major challenges of this project was the incentives being offered to those who handed over 
their weapons. From the projects experience, “when the incentives started to be offered, 
priority was given to those who handed over the largest number of weapons – this led to 
complaints from those who handed in fewer guns” (Mugumya, 2016 38). The EU has 
highlighted the short-term success of this project with the intention to conduct a similar one 
in the near future in their June 2018 Council Conclusions on Sahel/Mali (EEAS, 2018g). 
According to the report by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research the situation in Mali 
with arms control has improved but it still has a long way to go for people to move freely 
without fear of terrorist attacks.  
In addition to the weapons collection project conducted by the UN and EU, the UNREC held a 
workshop in Bamako Mali in September 2017 under an EU financed project to improve 
stockpile management in the Sahel. The workshop was organised in collaboration with the 
Mali National Commission on Small Arms and hosted 40 senior national officials. EUTM Mali 
was a key partner in this project. 
As can be seen through the current projects in arms control, the EU is making a significant 
effort in contributing to arms control in Mali through CSDP and international partnerships. 
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However, the illegal arms trade and trafficking in Mali remains to be a major issue for the 
Sahel region. A larger focus on arms control training within EUTM Mali could contribute to 
further developments in this area.  
5.7 Increased multilateral cooperation: Delivering international peace and security? 
The central lesson that has been learnt from experiences of conflict management and 
peacebuilding in the 21st century is that no institution or actor can manage these global 
challenges alone. The norm has become partnership peacekeeping operations – where 
operations involve collaboration between one or more institutions – as in the case of Mali 
where the UN and EU both operate. Although the peacekeeping missions are separately 
mandated, they complement each other and have jointly made a significant impact to 
eradicate conflict and focus on peacebuilding and state building in Mali. The EUGS made 
multilateral cooperation a priority which has been acted upon in Mali as was discussed in the 
findings chapter of this thesis. Having evidence of the coordination is relevant for the 
purposes of answering the research question in this thesis, however it is also important to 
examine how the EU and its partners can genuinely work together to achieve a unity of effort 
and have the biggest possible impact on the issues Mali faces.  
UN-EU cooperation on peacekeeping operations began in 2003 with the Joint Declaration on 
UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management. Germany and Italy continued formalizing the 
cooperation with the “EU-UN Partnerships Initiative” in 2014 when the EU Plan of Action for 
CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping was coming to an end. This Partnerships Initiative has 
developed UN-EU cooperation significantly and has identified and debated four crucial areas 
for UN-EU cooperation on peace operations: coherence in mandates and planning, training, 
military-capabilities, and justice and security sector reform (Hummel and Pietz, 2015 1).  
The EU and UN in Mali have exchanged resources extensively including personnel, training 
equipment, logistics and planning. This resource exchange has historically been limited to 
financial and diplomatic resources but more recently we have seen more ambitious resource 
exchanges, especially in Mali (Dijkstra et al., 2017 4). The joint trainings between EUTM Mali 
and MINUSMA goes beyond the traditional financial or diplomatic exchange and represents 
a new era of multilateral cooperation between the UN and EU.  
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There was initial concern within the UN when CSDP was introduced that it would distract 
potential European contributors to UN peacekeeping19 and that both organisations would 
compete with each other to make the biggest impact in external crises, however, this concern 
has not proven correct. The EU has become a reliable burden-sharing partner in peacekeeping 
for the UN and the EU has stated their commitment to the UN on numerous occasions. Former 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, stated in front 
of the UN Security Council in 2010 that “a core objective of EU foreign policy is the 
development of an effective multilateral system with a strong UN at the centre” (Ashton, 4 
May 2010). Today, the EU and UN are more and more intertwined, CSDP missions are 
deployed where the UN is also engaging, and, in some cases, missions are complementing 
each other and collaborating to have the biggest possible impact in the country or region. UN-
EU cooperation is arguably the most advanced cooperation between the UN and a regional 
group; the current cooperation covers a range of crisis management including peacebuilding, 
development, humanitarian relief, political cooperation and disarmament.  
The most recent development in cooperation between the UN and EU was a joint workshop 
that bought together members of the EEAS, the UN and EU Member States to work on the 
priorities for the UN-EU Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management 2019-2022. This 
workshop was held in March 2018 and co-hosted by the EEAS Crisis Management and 
Planning Directorate, UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security and the EU Institute for Security 
Studies. This theses timeline is until July 2018 which means it will be unable to answer 
whether the 2019-2022 priorities resulted in increased cooperation, this would be an 
important evaluation to make in future research. 
Although cooperation in Mali has been shown through MINUSMA and EUTM Mali, it cannot 
be denied that the UN and EU have different political agendas, objectives and institutional 
procedures which has resulted in situations where cooperation on the ground has had 
limitations. As Tardy pointed out, “the UN-EU relationship in crisis management remains 
constrained by political, structural and cultural obstacles that can only be overcome to a 
certain extent” (Tardy, 2009 52). The EUGS has highlighted the importance of increased 
                                                          
19 In July 2001, Austria and Ireland made statements saying that their commitment to ESDP could hamper 
them in contributing to UN peacekeeping. The Austrians then withdrew their personnel from UN Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus. 
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multilateral cooperation and evidence of this has been seen in Mali however, in other cases, 
cooperation has come second for institutions, like the EU, that are struggling for their own 
comparative advantages, visibility and identity. The EUGS emphasises that in a changing 
global environment, conflicts have deepened, and new dangers have emerged requiring the 
EU and UN to step up as indispensable partners to deliver peace and security. It is important 
moving forward that both institutions planning bodies incorporate the planned “inter-
institutional coordination” to any mandate to ensure consistency in future peacekeeping 
operations.  
5.8 Enhancing EU Peacekeeping Capabilities 
CSDP missions, together with the EU’s diplomatic and development initiatives, are the most 
visible initiatives of EU external action. The complexity of current ongoing crises and the EU’s 
engagement in these areas requires ongoing assessment of the EU as an international actor 
and an evaluation of the impact that current conflict prevention and management initiatives 
are having on the country and region in order to improve action in future missions.  
CSDP experiences in the past have largely been a self-discovery process for the EU, where the 
EU has developed its character as an international actor in order to contribute to upholding 
international peace and security. The aim of this section is to offer recommendations that will 
enhance EU peacekeeping capabilities for future missions.  
Firstly, the EU should create a CSDP database. Through this research process it has become 
apparent that there is a lack of a centralized source of information regarding CSDP missions 
that are credible and comprehensive. Many of the sources used for this research were 
fragmented across a range of different websites, journals, blogs etc. Therefore, the suggestion 
to create a CSDP database would make research CSDP much easier and less time consuming 
for researchers, especially those looking at more than one CSDP mission. Despite the 
continued efforts by EU institutions to increase transparency and provide information about 
current and previous missions, basic information on CSDP missions still remains difficult to 
access. To research a particular mission, often the researcher has to find data which is 
fragmented across a range of sources including journal articles, press releases, official 
websites, newspapers and other publications. Therefore, the existing knowledge base on 
CSDP lacks a single, centralized source with credible and comprehensive data.  It would be 
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useful to have a centralized source that reports basic information regarding a CSDP mission 
like the year of deployment, which Member States contribute to the mission, budget etc. This 
database would be an accurate source of information for researchers and fill many of the gaps 
that existing sources have while minimalizing the time it would take for a researcher to gather 
the relevant information to analyse CSDP.  
Another recommendation, which has derived from lessons in Mali, is to involve local and 
international partners in the planning phase of establishing a CSDP mission. Because planning 
is multi-faceted and involves politics, strategy, logistics, collaboration and implementation, it 
is important to have a core planning team which consists of those most active in the CSDP 
operation. Currently the EU’s Crisis Management Procedures, which is the central guideline 
for EU engagement in external crises, is outdated and needs adapting to the current global 
environment which is promoting multilateralism at the forefront. The EUGS has made it clear 
the EU is increasingly becoming one of the most important foreign and security players on 
the global stage and enhancing partnerships and promoting multilateralism has been one of 
the main objectives moving forward. By involving local and international partners, the EU 
would be showing their commitment to long term engagement from the grassroots level. This 
would significantly enhance the legitimacy of CSDP missions and promote local ownership of 
missions which has been a criticism of CSDP in the past. 
Gender balance must be a key priority for achieving mandates in CSDP missions given that the 
importance of CSDP missions is likely to increase in the near future. The EUGS has resulted in 
an upgrade for the EU in the field of security and defence taking a more integrated approach 
to crises, one that includes gender as one of the dimensions of conflict. Several studies have 
shown that gender balance increases the operational success of missions (Chen, 2016, Hunt 
et al., 2014, Hoogendoorn et al., 2013), diverse teams have become the new norm. Asquith 
(2016) and Miller and Segal (2016) have both provided evidence in their works that police 
forces and military forces have performed better when the teams are more diverse and 
gender balanced. Ensuring women’s participation in CSDP missions is important to “sustain 
the EU’s credibility, to improve effectiveness, to promote equality at home and abroad, to 
increase the talent pool for personnel, and to make the best use of our financial resources” 
according to a report published by the European Parliament (Policies, 2017 1). As most 
personnel on CSDP missions are contributed by Member States, the promotion of gender 
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balance within CSDP begins at the national level with Member States fulfilling the promises 
to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security. 
Women bring a different perspective and skill set to CSDP missions. For example, when a 
mission is deployed to a country where women are culturally not allowed to talk to men 
outside their families the female staff could liaise with these women and have access to 
certain parts of society where men do not. NATO has set up Female Engagement Teams, 
Cultural Support Teams and Foreign Area Specialists in Afghanistan to ensure the mission can 
gain a better understanding of society and engage efficiently with the female population 
(Lackenbauer and Langlais, 2013). Haring (2015) emphasises the need institutions, like the 
EU, to ensure that their mandates reflect the society they are intended to protect. Mali being 
98% Muslim, it would enhance the mission further to have similar initiatives to NATO, so the 
EU can have the ability to engage further with the female population.  
CSDP in Mali has already demonstrated its commitment to training female trainers as shown 
in chapter 4, however, to enhance this further the EU should engage more female staff in 
training efforts. The 2016 CSDP Annual Report reported 9,000 people trained in civilian CSDP 
missions in 2600 with at least 1,300 being women (EEAS, 2016a 4). If the EU was to include 
more female trainers it could lead to more female personnel being trained and therefore raise 
the awareness about the importance of equality between men and women on CSDP missions. 
Currently, within the EEAS, three women are serving as Heads of Missions while seven are 
mean. Kenneth Deane, in his position as EU Civilian Operations Commander and also Director 
of the CPCC, has openly highlighted his determination to get this 50/50 representation back 
especially given gender equality is one of the core values embedded into the Lisbon Treaty 
(EEAS, 2018b). The UN has already set targets to meet gender equality within its system by 
setting the target of 50% by 2021 for parity of female police officers with the aim to have 50% 
parity throughout all UN positions by 2028 (EEAS, 2018b). Not only does having female staff 
increase the promotion of gender equality, it also contributes to the mission’s acceptance by 
the local population. In an article in European View, Women in the CSDP: Strengthening the 
EU’s Effectiveness as an International Player, the idea that female personnel can reach out to 
both men and women in the host nations was seen as an important factor influencing the 
acceptance of a mission by the local population (D'Almeida et al., 2017 313). The EU should 
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continue to promote the importance of gender equality in CSDP missions and encourage 
Member States to nominate more women. By doing this, the EU will hold itself accountable 
for its own standards on gender parity in employment and will demonstrate that its 
compliance leads to real change on the ground. 
Some of the prejudices that lead to a negative working environment for women working in 
the peacekeeping field are the negative perceptions that female colleagues do not have the 
physical ability to physically and psychologically achieve tasks. Women are leading, or have 
led, some of the EU’s toughest CSDP missions, in Afghanistan, in Mali and in Niger which 
contradicts the misconceptions that women do not have the capabilities to take on 
challenging roles or that they are less capable than men in this area. EU institutions still have 
a way to go in tackling these prejudices and appreciate the diversity, this will be done through 
the continued promotion of diversity within CSDP (Policies, 2017 25).  
In order to enhance EU peacekeeping capabilities, the EU must lead by example to drive 
change where CSDP operates. Behind the mandates and technical details of a particular CSDP 
mission, the EU’s aim is to develop sustainable solutions for the security issues faced by the 
host nation (Policies, 2017 22). It is important that the EU shows action on the ground to show 
its commitment to past statements and strategies. The EUGS has been used in this thesis to 
show that the EU is acting upon the ambitions laid out in the document, whereby we have 




CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrated the multidimensonal nature of CSDP missions as they implement a 
range of tools including conflict prevention, peacebuilding, providing aid, disarmament and 
arms control. The two ongoing missions in Mali, EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali, were chosen 
as case studies for this research to determine whether the EUGS, released in 2016, has had 
an influence on their activities and mandates. These two missions demonstrated their 
multidimensonal nature through incorporating judicial training and policing, border 
management, peacekeeping, arms control and the nexus between security and development 
in their mandates. Throughout this thesis, it has become clear that the EU aims to show its 
international actorness by using all tools at its disposal to address international conflict and 
crises. The release of the EUGS in 2016 created an opportunity for the EU to develop its 
international actorness and demonstrate its ability to act within ongoing crises.  
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was highlighted that the EU has set a priority for itself  as 
being a stronger global actor (Commission, 2016). This introductory chapter laid out the 
context of the conflict in Mali and the two ongoing missions mandates. Chapter 2 provided 
an overview of the relevant literature in the field by highlighting the importance of 
peacebuilding policies and the nexus between security and development for CSDP missions. 
The analytical literature also covered some of the key challenges facing CSDP today and in the 
future including the issue of political will and burden sharing as well as the impact of 
militarisation on the nature of the EU. Chapter 3 outlined the theortical approach for this 
thesis, identifying Chris Hills 1993 Capabilities-Expectations Gap. The EU has been criticized 
for not having delivered consistantly given the state of its economic system and the resources 
at its disposal, institutionally and politically. This chapter showed the relevance of Hill’s 
conceptualization of the Capabilities-Expectations today, despite it being introduced in 1993 
and introduced Toje’s modern conceptualization of a Consensus-Expectations Gap. From this 
chapter, it was concluded that the Capabilities-Expectations Gap was never intended as a 
static theory, but rather as a yardstick by which policy within the EU could be monitored. This 
thesis does exactly that; monitors the changes influenced by the EUGS to determine whether 
the Capabilities-Expectations Gap still exists or whether it has narrowed to more of a 
Consensus-Expectations Gap. This chapter also outlined the methodology chosen for the 
research as being predominantly qualitative content analysis and case studies of the two 
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ongoing missions in Mali, EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali. Chapter 5 outlined the findings of 
content analysis by taking core segments from the EUGS and providing evidence to suggest 
the EU may have translated these aspirations into action on the ground in Mali. The 8 most 
frequent terms within the EUGS were used to demonstrate EU action, these were peace, 
security, development, multilateralism, EU values, EU action, global and disarmament/arms 
control. Finally, chapter 6 is a discussion of the findings linking theory with the evidence. This 
chapter highlights France’s role in shaping EU action in Mali and discusses the EU’s future as 
a global security actor. France, being the former colonial power in the region, has contributed 
significantly to the successes achieved within EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali. France’s role 
in Mali, as outlined in chapter 5, shows how the mobilisation of the EU by one Member State 
can affect the political will of the entire EU. The two sub-questions of the research question 
are answered in this chapter followed by reccomendations for enhancing EU peacekeeping 
capabilities in the future.   
The research question aimed to analyse the 2016 EU Global Strategy and 2016-2017 CSDP 
Annual Reports to determine whether the EUGS has influenced mandates of specific CSDP 
operations. In order to enhance EU peacekeeping operations in the future it is important to 
understand if and how new and changing EU strategies can influence CSDP operations. We 
can see from this thesis that there is a strong correlation between the two ongoing missions 
in Mali and the release of the EUGS, suggesting influence. Despite the EUGS only being two 
years old, much has been done to translate the ambitions within the strategy into action. 
Monitoring the EUGS should be a priority for researchers in the field of EU studies for the 
forseable future as it will demonstrate the reality of EU external action.  
What this research has also shown is that CSDP is especially active on the African continent. 
Mali, being the only country to have two ongoing CSDP missions, has demonstrated that 
conflicts are often not confined to national borders but are transnational in nature. The EU 
has realised this and are tackling the crises in the region through a regional and 
comprehensive approach (EEAS, 2015a).  Given Africas geographical proximity to Europe and 
the potential for spillover effects of terrorism, migration and organised crime, Africa is likely 
to remain the region hosting the most CSDP operations in the future (Merket et al., 2015 31). 
Therefore, this thesis would like to conclude with the reccomendation to increase dialogue 
and incorporate regionalism into the future CSDP missions in order for missions to be more 
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transparent, effective, and equal. This is an area for further research and due to time 
limitations, this thesis could not incorporate this dimenson into the study. As mentioned in 
chapter 4, the impact of militarisation of the EU would be an interesting field of study for 
scholars. The EUGS has had a role in the renewed interest of defence for the EU but it is still 
too soon to examine exactly what impact this will have on CSDP and the EU in general.  
Brexit is also casting a shadow over many upcoming financial processes the EU and its 
Member States need to face. The EU has started discussion around the new Multiannual 
Financial Framework 2021-2027 and the future relations with the countries of the African 
Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) following the end of the Cotonou Agreement in 2020 
(Henokl, 2017) which will directly impact Mali. The future of the cooperation with the ACP 
countries is uncertain proceeding the Cotonou Agreement, however it is unlikely the UK will 
participate in any new partnership because of Brexit despite 42 of the 53 Commonwealth 
countries being included in ACP. The EU prides itself on being the world’s largest donor to 
development aid; the Brexit process may mean a substantial loss for the EU as a global donor 
given that the UK contributes around 15% of the EU’s aid budget (McAvan, 2016). The future 
of the development budget will be left extremely vulnerable post 2020 if other Member 
States do not step up and fill the financial gaps left by the UK’s previous aid contributions, this 
‘Brexit gap’ has been estimated at between €10 and €11 billion (net) per year (Rubio, 2017). 
EU capabilities throughout the world will be significantly impacted by this loss of budget if the 
UK decides to undertake a “hard Brexit” whereby they would set up their own international 
alliances and keep these funds (Parliament, 2017), this particular scenerio would impact CSDP 
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